

# THE ROLE OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE MILITARY TRANSFORMATION PROCESS

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degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

ŞENOL DEVECİ, MAJOR, TURKISH ARMY  
BA, Turkish Army War Academy, Ankara, 2002  
MA, Beykent University, Istanbul, 2007

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Şenol Deveci

Thesis Title: The Role of Emotional Intelligence in the Military Transformation Process

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chair  
Thomas Bradbeer, Ph.D.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Billy D. Miller Jr., M.A.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Gerald Sewell, M.A.

Accepted this 10th day of June 2016 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

### THE ROLE OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE MILITARY TRANSFORMATION PROCESS, by Major Şenol Deveci, 130 pages.

How does emotional intelligence affect the military transformation process? Military transformation usually takes a significant amount of time and throughout this process there are potential obstacles that impact the success. Some of these obstacles are: unable to create a sense of urgency, resistance, lack of commitment, lack of vision, lack of cooperation, personal interests, and tendency to keep the routine.

Can military organizations and specifically leaders, overcome these obstacles while fostering emotional intelligence? This study aims to define the role of emotional intelligence during the military transformation process. It first examines the change models to construct a military transformation process model. Then the research applies this model to three case studies: The German and British Army transformation efforts during the interwar period under the command of General Hans von Seeckt and Field Marshal Archibald M. Messingberd respectively, and the US Army transformation effort under the command of General Eric Shinseki from 1999 to 2004, finally analyzes the role of emotional intelligence within transformational leadership.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

There is nothing permanent except change.<sup>1</sup>

— Heraclitus

Change is an evitable fact, and militaries have been trying to transform themselves throughout the history. However, change is a hard work. History presents significant number of unsuccessful military transformation efforts besides successful ones. During the military transformation process, several factors affect the result of the transformation. According to Dr. John P Kotter, Ph.D., a leading expert in change management, many change efforts fail due to a lack of commitment, communication, and success to deal with resistance to change.<sup>2</sup> All of the factors that John Kotter sees as the reason for failure are emotional intelligence-related issues.

Another important factor and key actor in the military transformation are leaders. A leader's belief and support in transformation has a great impact on its success. In many successful cases, the transformational leaders and their emotional intelligence are the primary driving force of the military transformation process.

There are significant amounts of studies about emotional intelligence, transformational leadership, military transformation, the relationship between emotional intelligence and transformational leadership, and the relationship between emotional intelligence and resistance to change. However, there has been no study up to this time that has specifically focused on the role of emotional intelligence and transformational leadership during the military transformation process.<sup>3</sup> This research will specifically focus on the role of emotional intelligence and transformational leadership in the military

transformation process by examining three historical case studies as examples. This research may assist military leaders to understand the importance of emotional intelligence and transformational leadership abilities in addressing the obstacles to the military transformation process.

### Primary Research Question

How does emotional intelligence effect the military transformation process?

### Secondary Research Questions

What is emotional intelligence, and what is the relationship between emotional intelligence and transformational leadership?

What is military transformation process, and what are phases of that process?

What can be used as a guiding template for military transformation process?

What is the role of emotional intelligence in previous successful and unsuccessful military transformation efforts?

What is the role of leaders in previous successful and unsuccessful military transformation efforts?

### Assumptions

The relevancy of this thesis is based on several assumptions. First, the researcher assumes that selected historical military transformation case studies can be used to make deductions and generalizations about the topic. Second, it is possible to develop emotional intelligence through appropriate education methods. Lastly, it is possible to develop transformational leadership abilities with appropriate training and education.

## Definitions

Change Vision: A concise statement of where a group or organization and its people are headed.<sup>4</sup> Kotter emphasizes the importance of effective change vision, and sees it as essential for the success of the transformation process. Kotter defines the characteristics of an effective vision as imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused, flexible, and communicable.<sup>5</sup>

Emotional Intelligence: Mayer and Salovey's commonly accepted definition defines emotional intelligence as "the ability to perceive emotion, integrate emotion to facilitate thought, understand emotions, and to regulate emotions to promote personal growth."<sup>6</sup> Daniel Goleman, who formulates emotional intelligence in theory of performance, and suggests four major emotional intelligence domains: self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management.<sup>7</sup>

Military Transformation: A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit a nation's advantages, and limits vulnerabilities to sustain country's strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.<sup>8</sup>

Military Transformation Process: Military transformation process is the change process that goes through a series of phases in order to transform militaries. It usually requires a considerable length of time.

Resistance to Change: The unwillingness and lack of commitment to change effort due to the changes to routines, low trust, lack of competence, and poor communication.

### Limitations

Time constraint is a major limitation of the study. The researcher has eight months to research and write the thesis, which limits the depth of the research. Time constraint also affected the methodology selection since survey and interview methodology processes would take considerable length of time compared to case study methodology. Five civilian and two military change models will be researched for similarities in the literature review to build a guiding change model template.<sup>9</sup> Case study methodology is also a limitation for this research. Three historical case studies will be analyzed to make conclusions about the role of emotional intelligence in the military transformation process, which limits the validity of the results of this thesis. Lastly, the researcher limited access to documents about the first case study about the interwar period of German Army military transformation since most of the documents are in German and do not have English translation. The researcher primarily used James Corum's book, *The Roots of the Blitzkrieg*, as the main source for the first case study.

### Delimitations

Based on the researcher's expertise and time limitation, the role and importance of emotional intelligence will be restricted to researching the military transformation process. In order to neutralize the analysis of data about the impact of cultural differences to military transformation process, Western military transformation examples will be used as case studies. Strategic level military transformations will be used as case studies. The researcher acknowledges there are many factors that contribute to the success of military transformation during process. This research will only focus on emotional intelligence.

## Conclusions

This study will explore the role of emotional intelligence in previous military transformation experiences. The results of this research may assist military transformational leaders to understand the importance of emotional intelligence in addressing the obstacles to the military transformation process.

The literature review will focus on the evaluation of the emotional intelligence concept, explanation of civilian and military change models, the military transformation process, and studies conducted outside the military about the relationship between emotional intelligence and change. The researcher used three military transformation case studies to support the analysis and conclusion.

An explanation of the methodology used in the research as well as case studies will be explained in chapter 3. In chapter 4, the researcher will analyze the findings of the case studies. In the final chapter, the researcher will make conclusions and recommendations for future research in the field of military transformation.

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<sup>1</sup> Heraclitus, "Authors," BrainyQuote, accessed 5 March 2016, <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/h/heraclitus.html>.

<sup>2</sup> John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 3-15.

<sup>3</sup> The researcher makes this assertion based on his interest and readings in the topic for last six years, and database research conducted by the professional research librarians of the U.S. Army Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library.

<sup>4</sup> John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 1, quoted in Pamela S. Shockley-Zalabek, Sherwyn Morreale, and Michael Hackman, *Building High Trust Organization: Strategies for Supporting Five Key Dimensions of Trust* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010), 48-51.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 67-83.

<sup>6</sup> John D. Mayer and Peter Salovey, “What is Emotional Intelligence?” in *Emotional Development and Emotional Intelligence: Educational Implications*, ed. Peter Salovey and David Sluyter (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 3-31; Charles Spielberger, ed., *Encyclopedia of Applied Psychology* (Boston: Elsevier Academic Press, 2004), s.v. “Emotion.” *Encyclopedia of Applied Psychology* states three major emotional intelligence model; in chronological order (1) the Salovey-Mayer model (2) the Goleman model (3) the Bar-On model.

<sup>7</sup> Reuven Bar-On, “The Bar-On Model of Emotional-Social Intelligence,” *Psicothema* 18, no. 1 (2006): 13-25, accessed 8 May 2016, <http://www.psicothema.com/pdf/3271.pdf>; Daniel Goleman, *Working with Emotional Intelligence* (New York: Bantam Books, 1998), 93. IQ and technical skills are important, but emotional intelligence is the sine qua non of leadership.

<sup>8</sup> Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002).

<sup>9</sup> A guiding change model template will be used when analyzing the role of emotional intelligence in the military transformation process.



## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Overview

In this chapter, the researcher will present a review of literature on the evaluation of the emotional intelligence concept; an explanation of civilian and military change models; an explanation of transformational leadership and its relevance with emotional intelligence; and the studies that have been made in other branches (outside the military) about the relationship between emotional intelligence and change. The researcher will also present a guiding military transformation process template, based on the analysis of the similarities of common civilian and military change models. This guiding template will be used as a model for analyzing the data in chapter 4.

#### Emotional Intelligence:

In 1990, John D. Mayer of the University of New Hampshire, and Peter Salovey of Yale University, posed the concept of emotional intelligence based on the concept of social intelligence created by Edward Thorndike in 1920.<sup>1</sup> Salovey and Mayer first coined the term, “emotional intelligence,” defined as “a form of intelligence that involves the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions.”<sup>2</sup> Later, the authors revised the definition to “the ability to perceive emotion, integrate emotion to facilitate thought, understand emotions, and to regulate emotions to promote personal growth.”<sup>3</sup>

Mayer and Salovey's conception of emotional intelligence model includes two areas. The experiential area is the ability to perceive, respond, and manipulate emotional information even if he or she does not understand it; and the strategic area is the ability to understand and manage emotions even if he/she does not certainly perceive feelings well or fully experiencing them.

Each area is further separated into four branches. The first, emotional perception, is the ability to be self-aware of emotions, to express emotions and emotional needs accurately to others and to distinguish between honest and dishonest expressions of emotion. The second, emotional assimilation, is the ability to differentiate among the different emotions one is feeling and to recognize those that are influencing the thought processes. The third, emotional understanding, is the ability to recognize complex emotions and the ability to understand shifts from one to the other. Lastly, the fourth, emotion management, is the ability to connect or disconnect from an emotion depending on its usefulness in a given situation.<sup>4</sup> Figure 1 depicts the Mayer and Salovey's Four-Branch model. The inner circle in the figure emphasizes the four branches of the model. The outer circle expresses the main activities that take place in each branch.




Figure 1. Mayer and Salovey's Four-Branch Model of Emotional Intelligence

Source: John D. Mayer and Peter Salovey, "What is Emotional Intelligence?" in *Emotional Development and Emotional Intelligence: Educational Implications*, ed. Peter Salovey and David Sluyter (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 7.

In the late 1990s, studies on emotional intelligence started to investigate why those who are in the highest intelligence levels are not always the best at either business or private lives.<sup>5</sup> The research will introduce two major emotional intelligence models by Dr. Daniel Goleman, Ph.D. and Reuvon Bar-On.

Daniel Goleman is one of the most well-known researcher on the emotional intelligence concept. He received his Ph.D. in clinical psychology at Harvard University. His book, *Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ*, was on the New

York Times bestseller list for a year-and-a-half, with more than five million copies in print worldwide in forty languages.

In this book, Goleman compiled emotional intelligence into five crucial skills. (1) self-awareness, the ability to be aware of one's feelings surrounding the individual; (2) self-regulation, the ability to control emotional reaction to events; (3) motivation, the ability to steer emotions into the intended objectives; (4) empathy, the ability to be aware of others' emotions; and (5) social skill, the ability to carry out the relationship to manage feelings of others.<sup>6</sup> He primarily expresses how those five crucial skills determine the success in relationships, work, and even physical well-being.

Goleman achieved impressive results by pairing emotional intelligence competencies with business life factors in 1998. He categorized the personal capabilities that reveal outstanding performance in organizations into three groups: "purely technical skills like accounting and business planning; cognitive abilities like analytical reasoning; and competencies demonstrating emotional intelligence such as the ability to work with others and effectiveness in leading change."<sup>7</sup> Goleman argues:

To be sure, intellect was a driver of outstanding performance. Cognitive skills such as big picture thinking and long-term vision were particularly important. But when I calculated the ratio of technical skills, IQ, and emotional intelligence as ingredients of excellent performance, emotional intelligence proved to be twice as important as the others for jobs at all levels.<sup>8</sup>

Reuven Bar-On is also a well-known author of another emotional intelligence model, which describes emotional intelligence as "an array of interrelated emotional and social competencies, skills, and behaviors that impact intelligent behavior."<sup>9</sup> Bar-On received his Ph.D. at Rhodes University in South Africa on psychology. Bar-On is the editor of an emotional intelligence questionnaire with which he tested its validity and

reliability in many countries. He conceptualizes emotional intelligence as a personal, emotional and social competence and skills index, and defines the five components of emotional intelligence as intrapersonal, interpersonal, adaptability, stress management, and general mood. Figure 2 shows these components and sub-components.<sup>10</sup> Bar-On suggests that emotional intelligence can be improved through training, programming, and therapy.<sup>11</sup>

Table 1. Bar-On's Model of Emotional Intelligence

Components	Sub-Components
Intrapersonal	Self Regard Emotional Self-Awareness Assertiveness Independence Self-Actualization
Interpersonal	Empathy Social Responsibility Interpersonal Relationship
Adaptability	Reality Testing Flexibility Problem Solving
Stress Management	Stress Tolerance Impulse Control
General Mood Components	Optimism Happiness

Source: Reuven Bar-On, "The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-I)," *Psicothema* 18 (2006): 8, accessed 8 May 2016, <http://www.psicothema.com/pdf/3271.pdf>.

Emotional Quotient (EQ), capabilities measuring emotional intelligence, are not anti-capabilities of Intelligence Quotient (IQ). These two concepts interact and support each other in real life. Bar-On defines an intelligent human as not only "cogtelligent" (cognitive intelligence), but also "emtelligent" (emotional intelligence).<sup>12</sup>

Emotional intelligence, in terms of the definitions above, is a determinant of the success of an individual's life, and is a combination of individual talent and skills that realize and recognize one's own feelings. It also allows individuals to control themselves in an appropriate manner, and perform in a self-motivational manner to achieve goals, have the social ability and skills to recognize the feelings of another person, to understand another person's perspective, and establish positive relationships with others. Scientists state that emotional intelligence is not a destiny, such as IQ, but it could be improved at any age.

A brief review of the literature related to emotional intelligence was conducted. The researcher will review the literature about change management and change theories from both civilian and military perspectives.

### Change Management and Theories on Change

Change management is an approach to transition individuals, teams, and organizations to a desired future state. Dr. John Kotter, Ph.D., provides a methodology for organizational change based on his experience and research.<sup>13</sup> Kotter states that the change process goes through a series of phases, and usually requires a considerable length of time to achieve.<sup>14</sup> Change models are tools used for successful implementation of the change process in organizations. There are many change models in the literature. Four of the more commonly recognized change models in chronological order are Lewin's Change Management Model, the McKinsey 7S Model, Kotter's Change Management Model, and the ADKAR Change Model.

## Lewin's Change Management Model

Lewin's Change Management Model was designed and created in 1947 for organizational and structured change by Dr. Kurt Lewin, Ph.D., who received his Ph.D. from the University of Berlin in psychology. This model consists of three main stages, which are unfreeze, change, and refreeze. "Lewin's work stemmed from his concern to find an effective approach to resolving social conflict through changing group behavior (whether these conflicts be at the group, organizational or societal level)."<sup>15</sup> Lewin's model has inspired organizational change model for studies and new models in the organizational change field, especially since the 1980s.

**Unfreeze:** The first stage is the preparation for the change process. It includes the necessary preparation of not only preparing the organization for the change, but also the fact that the change is crucial and needed. This phase is important for breaking down resistance to change because it prepares the members for an urgent need for transformation. The key tool for breaking resistance in this phase is to explain why the existing way needs to be changed, and how change can bring about profit.

**Change:** The second step is where the change takes place, and usually it may take time to happen since people need time to embrace new happenings, developments, and changes. According to Lewin, good leadership and reassurance is important at this stage, because these aspects direct the process in the right direction and make it easier for staff or individuals who are involved in the process.<sup>16</sup>

**Refreeze:** In the third step, the aim is to make sure changes are implemented in the organizational culture, and are used all the time. This is why the stage is referred to as refreeze. Figure 3 depicts the three stages of Lewin's Change Management Model.




Figure 2. Lewin's Change Management Model

*Source:* Operational Excellence Consulting, "Change Management Models by Operational Excellence Consulting," 8 February 2015, accessed 6 March 2016, <http://www.slideshare.net/oeconsulting/change-management-models-by-operational-excellence-consulting>.

### McKinsey 7S Model

The McKinsey 7S model was developed by consultants working for McKinsey and Company in the 1980s, and consists of seven steps for managing change (see figure 3). A brief description defines each step as follows:<sup>17</sup>

1. **Strategy:** The plan of the organization to reach its desired goals. Strategy defines what the organization is trying to do to gain competitive advantage versus competition.



2. Structure: The stage or attribute of this model that relates to the way in which the organization is divided or the structure it follows. It defines the authority relationships and power dynamics of the organization.
3. Systems: Basically, the processes of the organization, for example human resource processes or risk management processes. It becomes a major focus of how work is done.
4. Shared values: Primarily tells the superordinate goals of the organization; in other words, it defines what the organization is trying to achieve. It stands at the middle of the McKinsey 7S Framework depicted in Figure 4. The reason behind that is the other six circling factors all have to be relevant and reinforce the superordinate goals of the organization.
5. Style: Refers to the leadership style and organizational culture. It defines the how work is done within the organization and the specific characteristics of the organization.
6. Staff: Numbers, types, and intrinsic talents of employees within the organization.
7. Skills: Refers both the institutional and individual skills that define the core competence of employees, individually and as a whole organization.




Figure 3. The McKinsey 7S Model

*Source:* Robert H. Waterman Jr., Thomas J. Peters, and Julien R. Phillips, “Structure Is Not Organization,” *Business Horizons* 23, no. 3 (June 1980): 14-26.

### Kotter Change Management Model

Kotter’s change management model is one of the most popular and adopted change model in the world. Kotter is a Harvard Business School Professor and author of several books on the theory of change management. The Kotter Change Model is divided into eight stages (see figure 5), and each focuses on a key principle associated with the people’s response to change.

Create a Sense of Urgency. The first step is establishing a sense of urgency by indicating the benefits and necessity of change to overwhelm complacency. A successful leader establishes this sense of urgency by ensuring the members understand why the change is necessary, explaining how it will benefit the organization, and what may

happen to the organization if it does not take place. According to Kotter, this step is essential because transformation attempts require aggressive cooperation and high motivation of individuals in the company. Based on his real experience Kotter says over 50 percent of the companies fail in this phase.<sup>18</sup>

Creating the Guiding Coalition. After creating sense of urgency, the leader needs a powerful coalition because he/she cannot be everywhere. According to Kotter:

Major changes are impossible unless the head of the organization is an active supporter. What I am talking about goes beyond that. In successful transformations, the chairman or president or division general manager, plus another 5 or 15 or 50 people come together and develop a shared commitment to excellent performance.<sup>19</sup>

Developing a Vision and Strategy. This stage is related to developing a picture of future. Kotter identifies six key characteristics of a successful change vision: it must be imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused, flexible, and communicable.<sup>20</sup>

Communicating the Change Vision. Clearly communicating the vision throughout the organization is one of the most important stages in the Kotter change process. Clearly explaining the necessity for change, how the change benefits the organization and its members, what is planned for the organization, and what may happen if change does not take place, is necessary so all members understand what is going on and what is to come in the future.

Empowering Broad-Based Action. Empowering others includes establishing decentralized control, training, listening, resourcing, aligning organizational systems to support the changes, and implementing solutions to problems.

Generating Short-term Wins. Kotter explains, “Without short-term wins, too many employees give up or actively join the resistance.”<sup>21</sup> In addition, he defines the

characteristics of a good short-term win as “first, it’s visible—large numbers of people can see for themselves the result; second, it’s unambiguous—there can be little argument over the call; and third, it’s clearly related to the change effort.”<sup>22</sup>

Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change. Leaders must capitalize on the successes garnered from short-term wins. Consolidating the effects of these successes allows leaders to maintain momentum and produces unforeseen opportunities for change in other areas of the organization.

Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture. Besides managing change effectively, it is also important to reinforce it and make it a part of the workplace culture.

Kotter provides an effective model to assist organizational leaders in successfully leading change. Often each stage takes a considerable amount of time to complete. Skipping a stage, making a critical mistake within a stage, or jumping ahead prematurely can have a crippling effect on the success of the change initiative.<sup>23</sup>




Figure 4. Kotter Change Model

*Source:* John P. Kotter, "The 8-Step Process for Leading Change," Kotter International, 2016, accessed 8 May 2016, <http://www.kotterinternational.com/the-8-step-process-for-leading-change/>.

#### ADKAR Change Model

The ADKAR change model was developed in 2003 by Jeffrey M. Hiatt, who is a recognized author in the field of change management. Jeffrey M. Hiatt holds a Master's degree in Mechanical Engineering from Rutgers University. He primarily focuses on the management of the human side of the change that was based on the logic and basic inspiration for the development of the ADKAR Change Model. He expresses this in his book as:

Successful change, as its core, is rooted in something much simpler: How to facilitate change with one person . . . The elements of the ADKAR model falls into the natural order of how one-person experiences change. Desire cannot come before awareness because it is the awareness of the need for change that stimulates our desire or triggers our resistance to that change. Knowledge cannot come before desire because we do not seek to know how to do something that we do not want to do. Ability cannot come before knowledge because we cannot implement what we do not know. Reinforcement cannot come before ability because we can only recognize and appreciate what has been achieved.<sup>24</sup>

ADKAR change model is a goal-oriented model, which makes it possible for the various change management teams to focus on those steps or activities that are directly related to the goals it wants to reach. The goals, as well as the results derived and defined using this model, are cumulative and in a sequence. This means that while using this model, an individual must achieve each of the outcomes or results in a certain order so the change can be sustained and implemented. The model can be used to find holes or gaps in the change process. This model consists of five steps (see figure 6).




Figure 5. ADKAR Change Model

Source: Srinath Ramakrishnan, *Change Management Models - ADKAR, Satir, 8 step, Switch and Lewin Models*, 25 October 2014, accessed 6 March 2016, <http://www.slideshare.net/rsrinath99/change-management-models>,

1. Awareness—the need and requirement for change.
2. Desire—to bring about change and be a participant in it.
3. Knowledge—of how to bring about this change.
4. Ability—to incorporate the change on a regular basis.
5. Reinforcement—to keep it implemented and reinforced later on as well.

### Military Theories on Change and Transformation

In addition to the civilian change models, there are also several change models for military transformation. The Starry Transformation Model and Sullivan/Harper Transformation Model are two of the most well-known military change models.

#### Starry Transformation Model

General Donn Albert Starry, former commander of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command from 1977 to 1981, tackled the challenge of developing a doctrine to enable the U.S. Army to successfully defeat a larger Soviet land force. During the military transformation process, he identified seven general requirements for carrying out military transformation.<sup>25</sup>

An institution's first requirement is to identify a mechanism to manage change. The institution's mission is not only to define the need for change and its difference from past transformations, but also to describe the requirements to effect transformation. The principal staff and command personalities must possess an educational background to establish a framework for problem solving. The following attributes are required to effect transformational change.

1. A spokesman or institution needs to be appointed to be the champion for change.
2. A wider audience needs to establish an agreement about the transformation.
3. Continuity of leadership is essential.
4. Senior leadership must support the change.
5. It is important to conduct field trials and experiments.



## Sullivan/Harper Transformation Model

General Gordon Russell and Colonel Michael V. Harper identified eleven rules for guiding a military transformation in their book, *Hope is Not a Method*. They acknowledged these rules during their transformation efforts to reorganize the Army immediately after the end of Cold War era. These eleven rules are:<sup>26</sup>

1. Change is hard work, because leaders must simultaneously conduct today's operations and development of their organizations.
2. Leadership begins with values. Leaders use values to indicate the constants within an organization in order to provide stability and direction during the uncertain times.
3. Intellectual leads the physical. Imagining the future first takes place in the mind of the leader, and then must be communicated throughout the organization. This intellectual change guides the physical changes—in process, structure, and output—that manifest the transformation.
4. Real change takes real change. It would be difficult to create a substantive and enduring transformation unless the leader makes critical and effective alterations in the critical processes.
5. Leadership is a team sport. Effective transformational leaders create teams in order to empower them with a sense of responsibility for the success of the transformation effort.
6. Expect to be surprised. The hardest portion of creating the future is to foresee it. During the transformation process, it would be more than possible to

experience flaws. The organization and transformation effort that is successful is the one that counters the surprise.

7. Better is better. In transformation, one cannot define “better” using current qualitative values—better quality, reduced cycle times, shared information (lethal, mobile, and survivable). “Better” may include all these characteristics and more.
8. Today competes with tomorrow. One of the difficult aspects of military transformation is the need to improve the organization when operating, whether in peacetime, conflict, or war. In order to deal with this fact, military organizations must direct some of their resources—time, energy, the best people—toward the future.
9. Focus on the future. In today’s complex and fast changing conditions, a leader should focus on beyond the horizon in order to foresee and adapt the organization to the upcoming future conditions. Furthermore, a leader should empower and encourage a similar attitude in others to orient them to focus beyond today and take part in transforming the organization.
10. Learn from doing. Creating a learning organization—one that learns from doing and sharing information—is critical to transformation since these actions will trigger an essence of innovation and growth within the organization.
11. Grow people. The key factor for creating the future’s organization is developing the people. “The challenge is not to be the most creative boss or to have the most creative headquarters staff; it is to have the most creative organization, limited only by the collective imagination of all its constituents.”

Sullivan and Harper conclude that the most important thing for a leader is not a list of rules, but the use of critical thinking about the situation. Leaders should ask the following questions to demonstrate the critical thinking: (1) What is happening? (2) What is not happening? (3) How can I influence the situation?<sup>27</sup>

### A Guiding Template

There are many similarities among the change models that inspired the researcher to create a guiding military transformation process template. The purpose for creating a guiding template is to increase the accuracy of the study by eliminating the deficiencies and errors of each change model to research the role of emotional intelligence in a universal transformational model, using consistent steps for each change model. This guiding template will be used in the analysis of the role of emotional intelligence in the military transformation process in chapter 4. The guiding template consists of six steps.

1. Establish sense of urgency.
2. Build a guiding coalition.
3. Create a change vision.
4. Communicate vision.
5. Empower action/deal with resistance.
6. Implement change in the organization culture.

After reviewing the literature about the change models, the researcher will focus on transformational leadership, which started as a leadership style in literature in the mid-1970s based on the fact that leaders are the most important figures of transformation efforts and have huge potential effects on the success.

## Transformational Leadership

Kotter evaluates managing versus leading change as:

Managing change is important. Without competent management, the management process can get out of control. But for most organizations, the much bigger challenge is leading change. Only leadership can blast through the many sources of corporate inertia. Only leadership can motivate the actions needed to alter behavior in any significant way. Only leadership can get change to stick by anchoring it in the very culture of an organization.<sup>28</sup>

He comments, based on his huge experience in the sector more than twenty years, the significant component associated with the driving force behind the change process is leadership, leadership, and still more leadership.<sup>29</sup>

The leadership style that Kotter is signaling is transformational leadership.

James V. Downton first used the term, “transformational leadership,” in 1973.<sup>30</sup> In 1978,

James McGregor Burns conceptualized transformational leadership.<sup>31</sup> Burns

distinguished the differences between transactional and transformational leadership.

Transactional leadership refers to leadership models (apart from transformational

leadership) that scope the exchanges between leaders and followers. In contrast,

“transformational leadership is the process whereby a person engages with others and

creates a connection that raises the level of motivation and morality in both the leader and

the follower.”<sup>32</sup> Bruce J. Avolio and Bernard M. Bass define the factors of transactional

and transformational leadership as individualized consideration, inspirational motivation,

intellectual stimulation, and idealized influence for transformational leadership,

contingent reward, and management by exception for transactional leadership (see figure

7).<sup>33</sup>

The first dimension of transformational leadership is idealized influence. Bass emphasizes that to be seen as charismatic leader by the followers is an important part of transformational leadership.<sup>34</sup>




Figure 6. Transformational and Transactional Leadership Factors

Source: Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice* (Washington, DC: SAGE Publications, 2010), 180. For the original source, check Bass M. Bernard, *Transformational Leadership* (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998).

Robert J. House also states that charisma is an important part of transformational leadership. House emphasize that charismatic leaders are the ones who are capable of having perceptive influence on followers and are able to motivate followers.<sup>35</sup>

Second dimension is inspirational motivation, and it has a close relation to charisma. Transformational leaders are capable of inspiring and motivating their followers to accomplish great changes within the organization. If they can communicate

their vision effectively and continuously, they will attain the confidence and trust of their followers to assist them to achieve the vision.<sup>36</sup> Transformational leaders use their emotional intelligence abilities, not only to motivate their followers in transformation and vision, but also to overcome obstacles for achieving the vision.

Third dimension is intellectual stimulation. Bass defines intellectual stimulation as leaders encouraging intelligence, prudence, problem solving, and critical thinking.<sup>37</sup> This dimension constructs the primary difference between transformational and transactional leadership. It is also related with emotional intelligence since transformational leaders control their emotions, understand and analyze their followers' emotions, and motivate and encourage critical thinking and problem solving.

The last dimension is individualized consideration. This dimension defines the ability to create a supportive organizational climate in which leaders listen carefully to the individual needs of followers to become fully actualized. These leaders act as coaches and advisers to improve their followers.<sup>38</sup>

Since the leaders and their transformational leadership abilities are the most important factors in the transformation process, these transformational and transactional leadership factors will be used as assessment criteria to analyze the case studies in chapter 4.

### Conclusion

Having reviewed the literature on the evolution of emotional intelligence and several change models, the researcher developed a guiding template for a change model to analyze three case studies in the next chapter. The researcher reviewed the components

of transformational leadership to assess the abilities of the three organizational leaders who are the focus of the case studies.

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<sup>1</sup> Sally Planalp and Julie Fitness, "Thinking/Feeling about Social and Personal Relationships," *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships* 16, no. 6 (December 1999): 731-50.

<sup>2</sup> Peter Salovey and John Mayer, *Emotional Intelligence. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality* (Baywood Publishing, 1990), 185-211.

<sup>3</sup> Mayer and Salovey, "Emotional Intelligence," 3-31.

<sup>4</sup> Yvonne Stys and Shelley L. Brown, "A Review of the Emotional Intelligence Literature and Implications for Corrections," Correctional Service Canada, accessed 15 May 2016, <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/r150-eng.shtml>.

<sup>5</sup> Robert K. Cooper and Ayman Sawaf, *Executive EQ: Emotional Intelligence in Leadership and Organizations* (New York: Perigee Books, 1998).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Daniel Goleman, "What Makes a Leader? IQ and Technical Skills are Important, but Emotional Intelligence is the Sine Qua Non of Leadership," *Harvard Business Review* 82, no. 1 (January 1998): 82-91.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Reuven Bar-On, "The Bar-On Concept of EI," 2013, accessed 6 May 2016, <http://www.reuvenbaron.org/wp/the-bar-on-model/the-ei-conceptual-aspect/>.

<sup>10</sup> Reuven Bar-On, *The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i)* (Toronto, Canada: Multi-Health Systems, 1997).

<sup>11</sup> Stys and Brown.

<sup>12</sup> Bar-On, *Emotional Quotient Inventory*.

<sup>13</sup> Dr. John Kotter and his change management model is one of the most well known in the field of change management. He received his Ph.D. at Harvard Business School in Business Administration. Recently, he became the Konosuke Matsushita Professor of Leadership, Emeritus, at the Harvard Business School. Regarded by many as the authority on leadership and change, Dr. John P. Kotter is a New York Times best-selling author, award winning business and management thought leader, business entrepreneur, inspirational speaker, and Harvard Professor. His ideas and books, as well as his company, Kotter International, have helped mobilize people around the world to

better lead organizations and their own lives, in an era of increasingly rapid change. He is the author of eighteen books, twelve of which are bestsellers.

<sup>14</sup> John P. Kotter, *HBR'S 10 Must Reads On Change Management (Including Featured Article "Leading Change," by John P. Kotter)* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2011), 1.

<sup>15</sup> Bernard Burnes, "Kurt Lewin and the Planned Approach to Change: A Re-Appraisal," *Journal of Management Studies* 41, no. 6 (September 2004): 997-1002.

<sup>16</sup> Kurt Lewin, "Frontiers in Group Dynamics," in *Field Theory in Social Science*, ed. D. Cartwright (London: Social Science Paperbacks, 1947), 229.

<sup>17</sup> Lowell Bryan, "Enduring Ideas: The 7-s Framework," McKinsey and Company, March 2008, accessed May 6, 2016, <http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/enduring-ideas-the-7-s-framework>.

<sup>18</sup> Kotter John, "Leading Change; Why Transformation Efforts Fail," In *HBR's 10 Must Reads On Change*, ed. John Kotter (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2010), 3.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 72

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 121-122.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 23-24.

<sup>24</sup> Jeffrey M. Hiatt, *ADKAR: A Model for Change in Business, Government, and Our Community* (Loveland, CO: Prosci Learning Center Publications, 2006), 1-3.

<sup>25</sup> General Donn A. Starry, "To Change an Army" (remarks to U.S. Army War College Committee on a Theory of Combat, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 10 June 1982).

<sup>26</sup> General Gordon R. Sullivan and Colonel Michael V. Harper, *Hope is Not a Method* (New York: Times Business, 1996), 236-239.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 239.

<sup>28</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 30.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 30-31.



<sup>30</sup> James V. Downton, *Rebel Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in a Revolutionary Process* (New York: Free Press, 1973).

<sup>31</sup> James M. Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

<sup>32</sup> Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice* (London: SAGE Publications, 2010), 172.

<sup>33</sup> Bernard M. Bass and B. J. Avolio, "The Implications of Transactional and Transformational Leadership for Individual, Team, and Organizational Development," *Research in Organizational Change and Development*, 4, 231-272.

<sup>34</sup> Bernard M. Bass, "Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision," *Organizational Dynamics* 18, no. 3 (Winter 1990): 19-31.

<sup>35</sup> Robert J. House, as cited in John R. Schermerhorn, Jr., James G. Hunt and Richard N. Osborn, *Organizational Behavior* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2000), 299-300.

<sup>36</sup> Deloris Willis and Judy Thompson-Moore, "The Role of Transformational Leadership: Lessons Learned from Visionary Leaders," in *Perspectives on Leadership* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Management Staff College, 2008), 131.

<sup>37</sup> Bernard Bass as cited in Alannah E. Rafferty and Mark A. Griffin, "Dimensions of Transformational Leadership," 6.

<sup>38</sup> Northouse, 179.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CASE STUDIE

#### Overview

This chapter describes the methods used to answer the primary as well as the secondary research questions. This research study is an in-depth examination of the role emotional intelligence plays in the military transformation process. The goal is to collect data about the role of emotional intelligence in previous military transformations for possible use by military leaders and for future studies related to this topic. The specific research question is: How does emotional intelligence influence the military transformation process?

#### Data Collection Methods

This study will use case study research methodology. These case studies include both successful and unsuccessful military transformation efforts. The research will compare two past military transformations that occurred in the same era of the twentieth-century, one of which was a successful and the other was unsuccessful. As a third case study, the author analyzed one of the most recent military transformation efforts, led by U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki.

The research will focus on the analysis of the roles of emotional intelligence and transformational leadership abilities in the military transformation process. The researcher will use the Goleman emotional intelligence model for the analysis of emotional intelligence because the research focuses on the leaders' role in the transformation process, and in the researcher's judgment, Goleman's emotional

intelligence model is the most appropriate one. The researcher will use Avolio and Bass's transformational leadership model for the analysis of the role of transformational leadership abilities in the transformation process. Because this model is the most appropriate and the primary transformational leadership model in the literature for the analysis of the effect of transformational leadership abilities.

The researcher will use a modified version of the case study methodology used by the Department of Command and Leadership at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The framework includes eight components: Key Players, End state, Interests, Facts, Assumptions, Paradigms, the Problem and Organizational Vision. The researcher will use a modified version that includes:

1. Who is the key leader?
2. What is the problem and need for change? (Obstacle to overcome in reaching the change vision)
3. What are the organizational vision and the change plan? (A picture of the future framed by a value-based purpose that creates a path to drive behavior, change and motivation, and the plan to accomplish that picture)
4. What are the leader's interests? (Includes needs, wants, desires, concerns, and fears)
5. Did the leader follow a military transformation process to change the organization?
6. How did the leader demonstrate emotional intelligence during transformation process?

7. How did the leader demonstrate transformational leadership during transformation process?

The first case study analyzes the successful transformation process that occurred in the German Army immediately after the First World War.

#### Case Study One: The German Military Transformation (1919-1939)

In the first two years of the Second World War, the German Army dominated nearly all of Europe with amazing speed using a combined arms doctrine called a *Blitzkrieg*, only twenty years after its defeat in 1918. How did this incredible transformation happen under the conditions of a defeated army and a financially devastated country under the harsh conditions placed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles?

#### Who is the Leader?

When Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, he inherited the best-led, best-trained, and arguably the most modern army in the world in January 1933.<sup>1</sup> After First World War, Germany had to create a new army and command system under the circumstances of military defeat, partial occupation, uncertainty, and the restrictive conditions of Versailles Peace Treaty.<sup>2</sup> The creator, theorist, and primary trainer of this impressive force was General Seeckt.



Figure 7. General Johannes Friedrich "Hans" von Seeckt

*Source:* Like Success, "Hans von Seeckt Pictures," 2015, accessed 6 March 2016, <http://likesuccess.com/author/hans-von-seeckt>.

He was born to a noble Pomeranian family in 1866. His father was a Prussian general officer. He graduated from a civilian Gymnasium in Strasburg contrary to most of his colleagues. He was commissioned in 1887, and in 1893, qualified for the German staff college, the *Kriegsakademie*. He was one of the few officers selected for the General Staff Corps. He gained experience from 1896 to 1914 in various assignments as a battalion commander and several staff assignments, including the mobilization section of the Great General Staff from 1897 to 1899, the staff officer of the 18th Army Corps in Danzig from 1899 to 1902, company commander in Dusseldorf from 1902 to 1904, staff officer to the Fourth Division at Bromberg from 1904 to 1906, staff officer to the General

Staff in Berlin from 1906 to 1909, and staff officer to the Second Army Corps at Stettin from 1909 to 1912.<sup>3</sup>

He was fluent in several languages and well-travelled, visiting Egypt and India as well as all of the European countries. He enjoyed reading English authors, including the works of John Galsworthy and George Bernard Shaw. In the First World War, he served on the both Western and Eastern Fronts. He also worked with the Central Power militaries, including Austria, Bulgaria, and Ottoman Empire. Von Seeckt was famous for having never lost a battles during the First World War.<sup>4</sup>

At the beginning of the First World War, from August 1914 to March 1915, he was the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army Corps, which made significant advances through Belgium and France. One staff officer, who served with him in the 3rd Army Corps, described him as “always radiating calmness,” and “maintaining control” in battle.<sup>5</sup> From March 1915 to the end of the war, von Seeckt was appointed to the Eastern Front which included assignments as Chief of Staff of the 11th Army, and Chief of Staff of the Ottoman Army. He demonstrated great strategic and political abilities as well as great cooperation and teamwork ability with the Axis Armies in Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey.<sup>6</sup>

He showed important political perception in 1915 when he advised the German high command that once the Bulgarians defeated the Serbs, their traditional enemy, they would achieve their traditional goals. At that point, the only practical reason for keeping the Bulgarian Army in the war would be to use it on the Salonika Front to hold the Allied Army in check.<sup>7</sup>

Austrian Duke Windiscgratz acknowledged von Seeckt's political and strategic skills. He pointed out, "He was one of the very few who truly realized our complicated relationships and understood not only Austrian weaknesses but their causes."<sup>8</sup>

### What is the Problem and Need for Change?

Germany's legacy from the First World War was a crushed Army, a devastated economy, and an extremely harsh, conditional peace treaty. According to Versailles Peace Treaty, the German Army was limited to a maximum of 100,000 personnel within seven infantry and three cavalry divisions. The total number of officers were limited to four thousand, to include the general staff officers. The German Army was restricted to no other weapons than rifles, carbines, machine guns, light and medium trench mortars, and 10.5 cm. howitzers. Figure 9 depicts the maximum allowed number of weapons and munitions for German Army. Furthermore, officer training was limited to three military schools; conscription was stopped; and soldiers' and non-commissioned officers' terms of enlistment were restricted to prevent Germany from reestablishing a large militia. The German Army was standing for a total reconstruction in order to adapt and overcome the new harsh conditions.

Table 2. Maximum Number of Arms and Munitions  
Authorized According to Versailles Peace Treaty

Material	Maximum number of Arms author- ised	Estab- lishment per unit	Maximum totals
Rifles . . . . .	84, 000	<i>Rounds</i>	<i>Rounds</i>
Carbines . . . . .	18, 000	400	40, 800, 000
Heavy machine guns . . . . .	792	8, 000	15, 408, 000
Light machine guns . . . . .	1, 134		
Medium trench mortars . . . . .	63	400	25, 200
Light trench mortars . . . . .	189	800	151, 200
Field artillery:			
7.7 cm. guns . . . . .	204	1, 000	204, 000
10.5 cm. howitzers . . . . .	84	800	67, 200

*Source:* United States, Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), 28 June 1919. UST 58, pt. 9, accessed 25 March 2016, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0043.pdf>.

The resource problem, combined with the low morale of a defeated organization, a national economy in ruins, and the overwhelming restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were the major problems that von Seeckt faced.

#### What is the Organizational Vision and the Change Plan?

Von Seeckt's vision was to create an effective, highly mobile professional force, which would use combined arms maneuvers supported by a robust air force. Von Seeckt saw the uselessness of "immobile levy in mass" during First World War, especially on the Eastern Front where well-trained, well-led, and well-equipped German forces defeated larger enemy forces. He pointed out after the First World War:

To what military success did this universal levy in mass, this gigantic parade of armies lead? In spite of every effort the war did not end with decisive destruction of the enemy on the field of battle; for the most part it resolved itself into a series of exhausting struggles for position until, in the face of an immense superiority of force, the springs which fed the resistance of one of the combatants,



the sources of its personnel, its materiel, and finally of its morale dried up. . . . Perhaps the principle of the levy in mass, of the nation in arms, has outlived its usefulness, perhaps the *fureur du nombre* has worked itself out. Mass becomes immobile, it cannot maneuver and therefore cannot win victories, it can only crush by sheer weight.<sup>9</sup>

Von Seeckt built his change plan on the basics of accurately understanding the outcomes of First World War, and creating the new German Army doctrine under the extremely harsh restrictions of the Versailles Peace Treaty. The Versailles Peace Treaty limited the German Army's personnel strength to no more than 100,000, and an officer corps with a maximum of four hundred. It also forced German Army to disarm, and imposed 132-billion Deutsche Mark in reparations.

Von Seeckt began his research and study by analyzing the results of the First World War. He established fifty-seven committees of general staff officers and experts in particular areas to examine the broad and specific questions raised after First World War. General staff officers led these committees and, in the end, over four hundred officers were involved in this work.<sup>10</sup>

The results of these committees' analyses was turned into the German Army's new doctrine, *Army Regulation 487, Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms*.<sup>11</sup> As an introduction to the regulation, von Seeckt emphasized, "This regulation takes the strength, weaponry and equipment of a modern military major power as the norm, not that of the Peace Treaty's specified German 100,000-man army."<sup>12</sup>

#### What are the Leader's Interests?

General von Seeckt was restricted by the conditions of the Versailles Peace Treaty. The German Army lost their best attack divisions and, most of their experienced officers and NCOs.<sup>13</sup>

There were numerous schools of military thoughts within the existing German Army on how to control the new army. The most significant was “the defensive school” of thought. The most important supporter of this school was General of the Infantry, Walther Reinhardt.<sup>14</sup> Reinhardt believed and argued that defense had the military advantage. He also believed and supported giving the front line officers important roles and positions in the new army. He opposed the strategy and tactics of General von Seeckt until his death in 1930. In addition to the school of military thoughts, it could be useful to mention the traditionalists, who upheld a dominant padlock on decisions throughout the war. They would have sustained their control over the German Army if the Germans won.<sup>15</sup>

In spite of the unfavorable conditions, General von Seeckt envisioned creating an effective, highly mobile professional force, which could alter the unfavorable conditions, and create a more favorable future for Germany. He required highly intellectual, dedicated leaders, who could inspire and motivate the entire German Army to create a more favorable future.

#### Did the Leader Follow a Military Transformation Process to Change the Organization?

General von Seeckt followed a military transformation process to change the German Army according to his vision. The situation was extremely urgent so he did not need to establish a sense of urgency. First, he started with creating his vision and organizing the new professional Army according to that vision. Second, he initiated research and efforts to create a modern military doctrine, based on the outcomes of the First World War. He established fifty-seven teams to research the outcomes of the First

World War.<sup>16</sup> These teams, not only researched the results of the First World War, but also functioned as General von Seeckt's guiding coalition. Lastly, he established a comprehensive training program, which placed the highest importance on leader development. Focusing on training and leader development helped General von Seeckt to empower action and implement the change in the organizational culture.

### How Did the Leader Demonstrate Emotional Intelligence During Transformation Process?

The loss of the First World War and the Versailles Peace Treaty furthered the collapse of the morale of the German Army. General von Seeckt had to establish a new Army and also had to abide by the restrictions the Versailles Peace Treaty imposed upon Germany. The situation was very sensitive, and he had to perform as a role model, who inspired and motivated every member of the German Army toward the goal of creating an effective, highly mobile professional force. There were some opposing ideas and groups, as aforementioned, which did not support von Seeckt.

General von Seeckt demonstrated emotional intelligence throughout the entire transformation process. First, he was aware of his emotions and able to manage them. He was the Chief of the Army Command immediately after the First World War. He inherited a defeated army with low morale. It would have been impossible to inspire the soldiers and to create the army as he envisioned if he had not controlled and managed his emotions, recognized others' emotions, and handled relationships.

Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring thoughts about General Von Seeckt, which he expressed in his memoirs, are a good example for General Von Seeckt's emotional intelligence abilities:

Professionally, the Berlin years were a schooling for me. What could have replaced the debates, often held in my room, in the presence of Lieutenant General von Seeckt, who knew so well how to listen and then sum up in a way that always hit the nail on the head? What a model General Staff officer and leader of men!<sup>17</sup>

### How Did the Leader Demonstrate Transformational Leadership During Transformation Process?

General von Seeckt demonstrated transformational leadership throughout the transformation process. This transformation process is characterized using the four components of transformational leadership: idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration.<sup>18</sup> It would have been impossible to create the new German Army without the presence and command of a transformational leader.

Idealized influence and inspirational motivation are inspiring role models. General von Seeckt acted as a perfect role model throughout his tenure as Chief of the Army Command. He envisioned the creation of an effective high mobile professional force, and worked to accomplish it decisively. He provided direction and motivation in the new German Army's doctrine, Army Regulation 487, *Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms*. "This regulation takes the strength, weaponry, and equipment of a modern military major power as the norm, not that of the Peace Treaty's specified German 100.000-man army."<sup>19</sup>

Intellectual stimulation is motivating people to be innovative and creative by questioning assumptions, reframing problems, and approaching old situations in new ways.<sup>20</sup> General von Seeckt demonstrated intellectual stimulation when he established the committees, to examine the broad and specific questions that raised in the First World War. He asked these committees to write,

short, concise studies on the newly-gained experiences of the war and consider the following points: a) What new situations arose in the war that had not been considered before the war? b) How effective were our pre-war views in dealing with the above situations? c) What new guidelines have been developed from the use of new weaponry in the war? d) Which new problems put forward by the war have not yet found a solution?<sup>21</sup>

General von Seeckt intentionally selected these questions to stimulate their creative and innovative ideas based on their battlefield experience from the First World War.

Individualized consideration is putting special effort into followers' needs for achievement and growth by acting as a coach or mentor.<sup>22</sup> General von Seeckt especially focused on the leadership development and training. He also actively participated in the daily training sessions. Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring served in these leader development and training sections as an instructor. He expressed his feelings about General von Seeckt in his memoirs that are a good example for General von Seeckt's individualized consideration abilities.

Another example of individualized consideration was the importance General von Seeckt gave to training and leadership development. In 1921, he declared his uncompromising goal "to make each individual member of the army a soldier who, in character, capability, and knowledge, is self-reliant, self-confident, dedicated, and joyful in taking responsibility as a man and as a military leader."<sup>23</sup>

## Conclusion

After the First World War, the German Army was devastated and the morale of the soldiers was extremely low. The Versailles Peace Treaty imposed very harsh conditions on the German nation. It was under these conditions that a visionary leader

was required. General von Seeckt was that visionary leader. He inspired, motivated, and rebuilt the German Army to his desired end state. Throughout the entire transformation process, he demonstrated emotional intelligence and transformational leadership. During his tenure, the German Army created its' new doctrine, Army Regulation 487, *Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms*, which would be the foundation for the German Army's Second World War doctrine.

In the first case study, research explained not only how the German Army had initiated a successful military transformation under the command and leadership of General von Seeckt, but also how the leader's emotional intelligence and transformational leadership abilities fostered and enabled the military transformation.

Next, the research will analyze a second case study that focuses on how the British Army failed to transform during the same time period as the first case study. The researcher will focus on the effort of the tenth Chief of Imperial Army Staff Field Marshal Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, who did not continue the transformation effort began during the tenure of his predecessor, General Lord Milne.

#### Case Study Two: The British Army during the Interwar Period (1919-1939)

During the interwar years, political, economic, and military culture prevented British Army from transforming and preparing itself for the next war. After the Great War, Britain was determined to avoid prolonged, ground involvement in another Continental war.<sup>24</sup> Instead, Britain pursued a national policy that gave core importance to sustaining its colonial system. The British government saw its Army as a colonial police force and the Navy as a shield to guarantee the island's security.<sup>25</sup> The British

government did not authorize the Army to prepare for a war on the Continent until February 1939.<sup>26</sup> These political considerations also affected the funding of the Army, which contributed to the inability to utilize a military transformation within the Army for the next war. Another factor was British traditional military culture that rested on the insularities of the regimental system.<sup>27</sup> Michael Howard, a military historian, evaluates the impacts of the British regimental military culture that “the evidence is strong that the army was still as firmly geared to the pace and perspective of regimental soldering as it had been before 1914; that too many of its members looked on soldiering as an agreeable and honorable occupation rather than a serious profession demanding no less intellectual dedication than that of the doctor, lawyer, or the engineer.”<sup>28</sup> During the interwar years, most senior leaders (excluding Lord Milne) did not feel an immediate need for change and prevented some transformation efforts. The most significant example was the tenth Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshall Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd.

## Who is the Leader?



Figure 8. Field Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd

*Source:* Photobucket, “Melron3’s Bucket,” accessed 6 March 2016, [http://s1282.photobucket.com/user/Melron3/media/3402f4a2-4af7-48e4-80dd-e1451d9b6cc1\\_zps7b81ac1f.jpg.html](http://s1282.photobucket.com/user/Melron3/media/3402f4a2-4af7-48e4-80dd-e1451d9b6cc1_zps7b81ac1f.jpg.html).

Field Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd served as the tenth Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) from 1933 to 1936. He was born in 1871 in Fivemiletown, County Tyrone, Ireland. His father was a landowner and a politician. He graduated from the Royal Military Academy, and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Royal Field Artillery in 1891. He served as an artillery officer in various positions between 1891 and 1905. He graduated from the Camberley Staff College in 1906 as a staff captain. Subsequent assignments included serving on the faculty of the



Indian Staff College, the Inspectorate of Horse and Field Artillery, and Aldershot Command as a staff officer between 1906 and 1914. During the First World War, he was assigned to the British Expeditionary Force as a general staff officer where he participated in the Battles of the Somme in 1916. The subsequent assignments of Montgomery Massingberd after the First World War to becoming CIGS were: the Chief of Staff of the British Army of Rhine from March 1919 to March 1920,<sup>29</sup> Deputy Chief of the General Staff in India from March 1920 to March 1922,<sup>30</sup> General Officer Commanding 53rd (Welsh) Division from March 1922 to June 1923,<sup>31</sup> General Officer Commanding 1st Infantry Division at Aldershot from June 1923 to June 1926,<sup>32</sup> General Officer Commanding of the British Army Southern Command from June 1928 to March 1931<sup>33</sup> Adjutant-General to the Forces from March 1931 to February 1933.<sup>34</sup>

In February 1933, he was selected to the tenth CIGS of the British Army. He served in this position until his retirement at 1936.

### What Is the Problem and Need for Change?

In order to understand the problem and need for change within the interwar British Army, it is essential to describe the environment that Field Marshal Montgomery-Massingberd was operating within in 1933 when he assumed his duties as CIGS.

The strategic environment in Europe was increasingly threatening. The German Army had initiated its' transformation effort immediately after the First World War and this transformation had been under way for more than a decade.

The British Army did not clearly understand the lessons and outcomes of the First World War until 1932. That year the CIGS, Lord Milne established a committee and provided guidance for it to "study the lessons of the late war, as shown in the various

accounts, and to report whether these lessons are being correctly and adequately applied in our manuals and in our training generally.”<sup>35</sup> The committee’s report was published in the very beginning of the Field Marshal Massingberd’s tenure.

From the end of the First World War through the start of Lord Milne’s tenure in 1926 there had been no serious transformation efforts initiated within the British Army. That changed when Lord Milne became CIGS in 1926. Under his leadership, he directed that the experiments in armored and mechanized warfare be conducted. In 1927, Lord Milne stated that both the increasing rates of firepower and the improvements in the technology of the gasoline-powered engines had the potential to dominate future warfare in which armored divisions would serve a critical role. He also expressed his concerns about the financial constraints that he believed would limit the British Army’s ability to develop armored divisions.<sup>36</sup>

By the time Lord Milne’s tenure as the CIGS ended in 1933 the transformation efforts that he had initiated five years previously were far from complete and required more detailed development and impetus by his replacement. More emphasis was required in the critical areas of doctrine, technology, training, and leader development.

Field Marshal Montgomery-Massingberd’s job was very difficult and several of the factors that would hamper the continuation of the transformation effort included public opinion inside the Britain, where the consensus was the country should not get involved in another war on the continent. A second critical factor was that the British Army’s budget did not allow for the continuation of the Lord Milne’s transformational effort. The government had given higher priority of funding to both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. Next was the military culture within the British Army whose

foundation was, based on the regiment. All of these factors would be impediments to the British Army's ability to transform itself successfully during the Interwar period.

#### What are the Organizational Vision and the Change Plan?

Field Marshal Montgomery-Massingberd did not have a clear vision. His organizational vision had changed while serving as the CIGS. Until 1935, he believed that the British Army should improve the mobility and firepower of the traditional formations, like infantry and cavalry regiments, using the newest weapons while restoring their formations.<sup>37</sup> He had thought the next war would be similar to the First World War, but this perspective was not realistic. Even Montgomery-Massingberd recognized the need for a serious transformation by 1935 after reading a Defense Requirement Committee interim report, which was emphasized the increasing threat in the international situation, especially from Germany.<sup>38</sup> He realized that light units, like infantry and cavalry, would be inadequate to address the German threat in Europe, which was rapidly building armored divisions. He believed that the Army should reorganize mobile divisions to consist of a tank and mechanized cavalry brigades, and an adequate proportion of reconnaissance troops.<sup>39</sup> However, under restrictive political and economic factors, Montgomery-Massingberd could not afford to create enough sense of urgency to obtain funding for transformation, preferring a gradual transformation, not an urgent one. Perhaps the reasons were political considerations and his conservative thoughts. The result in 1939 was that the British Army "had no tank in production, its artillery was antiquated, its antitank gun obsolete, and its vehicular support inadequate."<sup>40</sup>

It is also difficult to identify the existence of a change plan during the tenure of Montgomery-Massingberd. Although he realized a need for a mobile division, he did not organize any effort to establish a change plan to make this happen.

#### What are the Leader's Interests?

Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd was a conservative officer, and did not like or support any radical or big changes that would have affected the traditional military culture or formation of the British Army. When he was the Commander in Chief of the Southern Command, he affected the results and execution of the armored warfare experiments that took place in 1928, fearing the exercises might negatively affect the morale of the infantry and cavalry. During the conduct of the exercises, he attached a significant number of tank and mobile forces to the conventional force, and mandated the reconnaissance tanks to work with a cavalry brigade. These directives negatively affected the tank's mobility which resulted in, the umpires of the exercises concluding that neither side had achieved a significant advantage over the other and judged the result as a draw.<sup>41</sup>

Based on the results of this exercise, Montgomery-Massingberd met with the CIGS, Lord Milne and influenced his decision making about the ongoing transformation process. In his memoirs, Montgomery-Massingberd stated:

What was wanted was to use the newest weapons to improve the mobility and firepower of the old formations. . . . What I wanted, in brief, was evolution not revolution. . . . I discussed this question very fully with Lord Milne who was then C.I.G.S. and as a result the "Armored Force" as such was abolished and a beginning was made with the mechanization of the Cavalry and Infantry Divisions.<sup>42</sup>

Another example about his conservatism and reluctance to change was the modification of the committee report. Lord Milne established a committee, giving them

broad guidance to “study the lessons of the late war, as shown in the various accounts, and to report whether these lessons are being correctly and adequately applied in our manuals and in our training generally.”<sup>43</sup>

Montgomery-Massingberd received the committee’s report at the beginning of his tenure as the CIGS. The War Office wrote a new version of the committee’s report with significant omissions and changes to distort its findings into a more favorable outlook concerning its performance in the war.<sup>44</sup> This example demonstrates the conservative character of Montgomery-Massingberd who did not favor any radical changes or deviations from the current military organization.

#### Did the Leader Follow a Military Transformation Process to Change the Organization?

Montgomery-Massingberd did not follow any transformation process during his tenure since he did not see any emergent need to change the British Army until 1935. Up until that time, he believed the next war would be fought similar to the First World War. He firmly believed that tanks would be used in support of the infantry and cavalry instead of an independently in the concept of armored warfare. He instead envisioned the modernization and motorization of infantry and cavalry. As a result, the transformation effort that had been initiated for armor warfare during the tenure of Lord Milne lost its importance and popularity.

However, by early 1935, Montgomery-Massingberd was convinced that light units like infantry and cavalry would be inadequate to address the German threat in Europe. As a result, the British Army prepared a comprehensive proposal paper entitled, “The Future Reorganization of the British Army” and presented it to the Defense

Requirements Committee on 9 September 1935. The main point of this paper was to “reorganize the British Army on such a scale that will enable it to take part in a continental war.”<sup>45</sup> However, the Cabinet turned down this proposal by postponing a large-scale rearmament for three years.<sup>46</sup>

In conclusion, Montgomery-Massingberd did not feel an urgent need for transforming the British Army, and did not follow a transformation process until 1935. At the end of his tenure, he realized the need for a serious transformation, but could not get the political approval and could not initiate a transformation effort.

#### How Did the Leader Demonstrate Emotional Intelligence During Transformation Process?

It is difficult to make judgment as to the demonstration of emotional intelligence in the tenure of Montgomery-Massingberd since he did not initiate a transformation effort. However, it may be helpful to point out examples about the presence of emotional intelligence.

Montgomery-Massingberd believed the modernization and motorization of infantry and cavalry was more important than creating independent tank units. During the 1928 tank experiments, he affected the result of the exercises and convinced the CIGS about the abolishment of the Armored Force and the mechanization of the cavalry and infantry divisions.<sup>47</sup> To convince Lord Milne that the creation of an armored force was not in the best interest of the British Army Montgomery-Massingberd used his social skill, one of the four key components of Goleman’s emotional intelligence model, to win his argument. This example demonstrates the Montgomery-Massingberd’s emotional intelligence because the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Lord Milne was a great

supporter of armored warfare and establishment of the Armored Force.<sup>48</sup> Another example of his demonstration of emotional intelligence can be discerned from comments made by Brigadier P.C.S. Hobart in a letter to Basil Liddell Hart, the military correspondent of the *Times*. When Montgomery-Massingberd realized the growing German threat he decided to establish a tank brigade as a permanent formation. He assigned Brigadier Hobart to commander of that brigade, and encouraged him about the conduct of training of the organization. Brigadier Hobart mentioned his thoughts about Montgomery-Massingberd to Liddle Hart:

Most of the great ones scoff of course, but we are lucky indeed in having so far seeing, resolute and open-minded a chief of the imperial general staff who is giving us a chance to try and is so remarkably understanding.<sup>49</sup>

Although Brigadier Hobart's comments contradict most of the written documents about Montgomery-Massingberd, this example provides further evidence of the emotional intelligence of Montgomery-Massingberd. The critical shortcoming of Montgomery Massingberd was that he was not a transformational leader.

#### How Did the Leader Demonstrate Transformational Leadership during Transformation Process?

As mentioned, Montgomery-Massingberd was not a transformational leader, which was the core reason he could not initiate a transformational process during his tenure, most especially after he realized the seriousness of the German threat. It may be helpful to review the components of transformational leadership.

The first two components of transformational leadership are idealized influence and inspirational motivation, which emphasize the importance of being an inspiring and motivating role model.<sup>50</sup> There is not enough data and examples to characterize

Montgomery-Massingberd as an inspiring and motivating role model. The only example may be found in the comments of Hobart's about Montgomery-Massingberd to Liddle Hart. However, these comments are more about Hobart's appreciation about Montgomery-Massingberd's support and encouragement for the training of his new established tank brigade.

Furthermore, there are some strong examples that demonstrate the negative impact of Montgomery-Massingberd's obstruction of the establishment of armored division efforts. Montgomery-Massingberd's negative impact deterred tank innovators and dissuaded Lord Milne.<sup>51</sup> So Montgomery-Massingberd was not an inspiring and motivating role model.

The third and fourth components of transformational leadership are intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration, which emphasize motivating the followers to be creative and mentoring them to grow according to their special needs.<sup>52</sup> There is no available data or examples to show Montgomery-Massingberd as a motivating and mentoring leader to stimulate their creativity or develop them. However, there are some significant examples, as mentioned before, that demonstrate the conservative character of Montgomery-Massingberd. His character drove him to dislike the ideas that would cause him to change the traditional structure and culture of the British Army.

In summary, there are not enough data and examples to consider Montgomery-Massingberd as a transformational leader. There are clear examples that show he did not demonstrate the four components of transformational leadership.



## Conclusions

In the years following the conclusion of the First World War, the British Army did not experience a significant transformational effort until Lord Milne became the CIGS in 1926. Lord Milne realized the importance of the armored warfare and started a transformation process during his tenure, but his successors, starting with Montgomery-Massingberd, did not follow Lord Milne's lead. Montgomery-Massingberd negatively affected Lord Milne's transformation effort. Although Montgomery-Massingberd realized the need for a serious transformation by the end of his tenure, he could not initiate a transformation because he was not a transformational leader.

Williamson Murray states the effects to the British Army by the Chiefs of the Imperial Staff succeeding Lord Milne, starting with Montgomery-Massingberd:

But one must also recognize that the British government chose very badly in picking Milne's successors. These men comfortably assumed that what was good enough for the old army was good enough for them and quite simply failed to address any of the substantial problems that war in the twentieth century has raised. Once on the wrong track, the British Army would never fully recover from the cultural and intellectual mistakes made in the period between 1934 and 1940.<sup>53</sup>

In the second case study, research explained how important leaders and transformational leadership abilities are to the success of a military transformation effort. The absence of these two factors was the main causes for the British Army and its ill-preparation for the next war.

The research will focus on a more recent successful transformation effort was initiated by General Eric Shinseki, the 34th Chief of the Staff of the United States Army.

### Case Study Three: The US Army Transformation After 1999

The end of the Cold War brought about the question how militaries should react and adapt their organizations to the new international fuzzy environment. The U.S. Army, as the single superpower of the world, initiated the reorganization and transformation immediately after the Cold War. The main theme of the reorganization and transformation effort were to first reshape the Cold War-era U.S. Army to address the new, uncertain threat environment, and, second, digitize the force in order to utilize new emerging information technologies to the highest degree.

The transformation process began during the tenure of Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono, and continuing with his successors General Gordon R. Sullivan, General Dennis J. Reimer, and General Eric Shinseki.

One of the most noteworthy characteristic of this transformation effort was its continuity. Each succeeding Army chief of staff has continued the transformation effort by assessing, redefining, and adapting it. This continuity was passed along through successive appointments to the assignment of chief of staff. “Sullivan was Vice Chief of Staff to Vuono, Reimer to Sullivan, and Shinseki to Reimer, and a mix of other assignments had furthered the mentorship relationships among the pairs of men.”<sup>54</sup> “General Shinseki was thoroughly familiar with retiring Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer’s vision of the way ahead for the Army and was well prepared to carry it forward.”<sup>55</sup>

#### What is the Problem and Need for Change?

The First Gulf and Kosovo Wars revealed the rapid deployment problems of the U.S. Army and its heavy armored units. These units had unique combat power, but were

not rapidly deployable and logistically supportable. On the other hand, light infantry assets could be deployed quickly, but had insufficient combat power, tactical mobility, and capability for sustained operations.

A dispute began between the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, just after the Kosovo War, about the future roles and missions. The U.S. Air Force asserted that the air campaign of the First Gulf War demonstrated that air power would be the dominant force of future force projection and future wars, which the Kosovo War supported that argument. Public opinion perceived the U.S. Air Force was capable of winning the nation's wars solely based on its advanced command control, superior, and lethal precision-guided munitions, and stealth capability. This argument was risky for the U.S. Army since it was directly linked with future military budgets.<sup>56</sup>

General Eric Shinseki addressed these serious problems by evaluating and redefining the transformation effort initiated and sustained by his predecessors, and initiated a new transformation effort.

### Who is the Leader?

General Eric Shinseki initiated the U.S Army's second stage transformation campaign after the end of Cold War.<sup>57</sup> General Shinseki was born in Hawaii in 1942 to an American family of Japanese ancestry. His grandparents emigrated from Hiroshima to Hawaii in 1901. He finished high and intermediate schools in Hawaii. Shinseki has learned that three of his uncles had served in the 442nd Infantry Regiment, which is a unit of Japanese Americans, became one of the most decorated fighting units in United States history.<sup>58</sup> Since he motivated with his uncles' example, he attended the United States Military Academy and graduated in 1965 as a second lieutenant. He got an MA

degree in English Literature from Duke University. He got the United States Army Command and General Staff College, and the National War College education. During his military career, he served twice in Vietnam in the 9th and 25th Infantry Divisions as an artillery forward observer and company commander, various assignments including command duty in Europe for ten years, he commanded 1st Cavalry Division between 1994 and 1995, in 1996 promoted to lieutenant general and assigned to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army. In 1997, he promoted to general and commanded 7th U.S. Army. In 1998, he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, and in 1999, he became the Chief of Staff of the Army.




Figure 9. General Eric Shinseki

*Source:* General Posting Department, “Who is General Eric Shinseki?” *Veterans Today*, 6 December 2008, accessed 6 March 2016, <http://www.veteranstoday.com/2008/12/06/who-is-general-eric-shinseki/>.

#### What are the Organizational Vision and the Change Plan?

General Shinseki declared his vision during the annual Association of United States Army convention in October 1999, “Soldiers on point for the Nation . . . Persuasive in peace, invincible in war.”<sup>59</sup> The vision describes three specific goals: continuing domain. The graphic below was the slide that Shinseki used to explain his and caring for people; sustaining the readiness to react strategically throughout the world; and changing the Army into a force capable of dominating at every aspect on the operational

vision and change plan at that annual convention in October 1999. General Shinseki defined tangible goals from the very beginning for maturing his vision and plan.




Figure 10. General Shinseki's Vision and Plan for the Army Transformation

Source: John Sloan Brown, *Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the U.S. Army, 1989-2005* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History U.S. Army, 2011), 192.

He visualized his transformation plan in three phases. While sustaining and recapitalizing the “Legacy Force,” he planned the immediate start of building the “Interim Force,” and move on through to “Objective Force.” Medium brigade combat teams (BCT) were the key components of both his transformation plan and the Interim Force, which are more quickly deployable than existing heavy brigades, but more lethal and tactically more mobile than existing light brigades.<sup>60</sup> He planned to build two interim medium BCT, and a total of six to eight interim medium BCTs until 2008. Beginning in

2008, continuing beyond 2030, the U.S Army planned to transition to its Objective Force. During this period, all Army forces, including the Interim Force, were to be transformed into new organizational structures operating under new warfighting doctrine. The new combat systems were planned to be lighter and more mobile, deployable, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than current systems. The Army employed four competing research and development teams that planned alternative designs for these future combat systems. After the selection of the most promising future combat system in 2003, the transition process of the Legacy Force and Interim Force to Objective Force would have been accomplished by 2030.

#### What Are the Leader's Interests?

General Eric Shinseki was familiar with his predecessor's vision and the transformation initiated after the end of the Cold War as he had served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans from July 1995 to July 1996, and had been assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans a year later. After his promotion to the rank of General, he commanded the United States Army Europe and the Allied Forces in Bosnia. He served as the General Reimer's Vice Chief of Staff from November 1998 before becoming Army Chief of Staff. Shinseki had the opportunity to gain experience about the transformation both from both a staff and a field commander perspective.

General Eric Shinseki had a clear vision. Upon succeeding General Reimer as Chief of Staff, he developed a plan to address the problems of the U.S. Army, such as the lack of strategic responsiveness and the emerging debate between the Army and the Air Force. But in order to address those problems, he had serious needs. First, he had to

create a sense of urgency to gain support of public opinion, politicians, and followers. He also needed to obtain enough funding, which directly linked with successfully creating a sense of urgency. Third, he needed a coalition to create an irreversible momentum for the transformation effort. Lastly, he needed a successor, who would continue the transformation effort after him because this would be a long-term transformation plan.

### Did the Leader Follow a Military Transformation Process to Change the Organization?

General Shinseki followed a complete military transformation process to change the organization. He initiated the process before he assumed the Army Chief of Staff while he was the Vice Chief of Staff of General Reimer. John Sloan Brown, the director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, described this in his book.

Shinseki was familiar with the practice and undertook a particularly elaborate version to gather information and facilitate support for his programs downstream. An assessment group of over a dozen seasoned officers and command sergeants major headed by a brigadier general fanned out to interview over 350 selected general officers, members of the secretariat, congressional representatives and staffers, academics, and pundits. They also conducted sensing sessions with groups of field-grade officers, company-grade officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, junior enlisted men and women, and family members. This assessment group consolidated its results and fed them to an integration group, charged with developing short- and long-term campaign plans. The integration group authored drafts of the speeches and releases proposed for Shinseki's first two weeks, laid out a detailed program for his first six months, and outlined his entire tenure with respect to such foreseeable programs as Army Transformation. Most of the members of the integration group were senior field-grade officers already identified to serve on the CSA Staff Group (such as on the Army Chief of Staff's personal staff) once Shinseki became Chief, thus ensuring continuity as plans played out. A consulting group of selected senior officers and retirees reviewed the products of the assessment and integration groups as they emerged, and an executive group headed by a brigadier general coordinated the activities of the three other groups and shepherded administrative support.<sup>61</sup>

This was unique, because it enabled General Eric Shinseki to assume the Army Chief of Staff, completely prepared, without wasting any time. He issued his intent the



day after he became the Army Chief of Staff, clearly describing the problem and the urgent need for transformation.

Needed to be able to provide early entry forces that operate jointly, without access to forward fixed bases, and still have the power to slug it out and win a campaign decisively. At this point in our march through history our heavy forces are too heavy and our light forces lack staying power. Heavy forces must be strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint, and light forces must be more lethal, survivable and tactically mobile.<sup>62</sup>

He used the following four months to develop his guiding coalition and mature his vision and transformation plan. After those four months, at the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army, he explained why the Army was in an urgent need for a serious transformation. He described his vision and transformation plan to the attendees, who included Army four-star generals, corporate leaders, and invited guests from industry, politicians, as well as selected junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers from various military units.<sup>63</sup>

General Shinseki issued the transformation plan to Army units as the *Army Transformation Campaign Plan*. The missions and tasks in the plan were assigned to specific departments and units, and the objectives and milestones were clearly stated.<sup>64</sup>

General Shinseki unceasingly communicated the need for his vision, and the urgency for his plan in nearly all his speeches. Even while facing serious events like 9-11 terrorist attacks, the Global War on Terrorism, unconventional warfare in Afghanistan, and the continuing war in Iraq took place, Shinseki never allowed these to deter the Army Transformation Campaign Plan, but continued to empower transformation actions and efforts. At the end of his tenure, he achieved the establishment the five Interim Force Stryker Brigades as he had intended.<sup>65</sup>

## How Did the Leader Demonstrate Emotional Intelligence During Transformation Process?

General Shinseki demonstrated emotional intelligence throughout the entire transformation process. He demonstrated his emotional intelligence by establishing a large-scale commitment from a broad guiding coalition. He also demonstrated his emotional intelligence by building assessment, integration, and consulting teams during his tenure as the Vice Chief of Staff to establish his draft vision and transformation plan.<sup>66</sup> His aim was to learn and assess the emotions and thoughts of “a number of 350 selected general officers, members of the secretariat, congressional representatives and staffers, academics, and pundits,” and “groups of field-grade officers, company-grade officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, junior enlisted men and women, and family members” throughout the Army. This was a unique, creative idea, and demonstrated his emotional intelligence awareness of the importance of emotions for the success of the transformation process.

As another indicator of Shinseki’s emotional intelligence, at a speech at the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army on 12 October of 1999, he made an impression on the audience to convince them of the urgent need for a serious transformation. He began with a reminder that the Army was only several weeks away from the start of a new century and the next millennium. He continued, giving the historical example of Elihu Root and the tremendous transformation of the U.S. Army from a border army to a global one, which took place at the turn of the last century. He linked his historic example to the Army’s recent situation, “the Army was now between wars but was unlikely to have much time before it was tested again.”<sup>67</sup>

## How Did the Leader Demonstrate Transformational Leadership During Transformation Process?

General Shinseki demonstrated his transformational leadership during the transformation process. As one of the core members of General Reimer's guiding coalition, he was prepared and ready with his vision and transformation plan when he assumed the Army Chief of Staff position. Shinseki's leadership abilities are validated by a review of the components of transformational leadership

The first two components of transformational leadership are idealized influence and inspirational motivation which emphasizes the importance of being an inspiring and motivating role model for the followers.<sup>68</sup> General Eric Shinseki demonstrated a complete inspiring and motivating role model throughout his tenure as the Army Chief of Staff, while serving as Assistant Deputy and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and as Vice Chief of Staff. He stated his vision, the need for an urgent transformation, his transformation plan, and most importantly his belief in its success at any opportunity and in nearly all his speeches. He declared the Army Transformation Campaign Plan to be his highest priority, personal goal at the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army on 12 October 1999.<sup>69</sup>

The third and fourth components of transformational leadership are intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration, which emphasize the motivation of others to be creative, and mentoring them to cultivate them according to each one's special needs.<sup>70</sup> General Shinseki demonstrated intellectual stimulation before he even became the Army Chief of Staff. The aim of building three teams was to understand the thoughts and creative ideas of the participants as well as to monitor their emotions. He shaped his

sense of urgency, his vision, and his transformation plan according to the information acquired by these three teams. This was a good demonstration of intellectual stimulation.

Another example for the intellectual stimulation was the Vigilant Warrior Series, Army Transformation war games that were conducted by the Army War College from July 2001 until the end of General Shinseki's tenure. In those war game scenarios, various probable scenarios were applied to the Army's Objective Force building effort in order to assess, shape, and revise it.

During his tenure, General Shinseki gave high priority and emphasized individualized consideration, growing leaders, mentoring, and leadership development. It is clear that the scope of thirty years for Shinseki's plan was a long period of time. So individualized consideration, growing leaders, and mentoring were the *sine qua nons* of that long-range planning. That is one reason why General Shinseki built a broad guiding coalition to develop and mentor them besides acquiring their commitment to the transformation process.

On 1 June 2000, General Shinseki, directed the Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, to organize an Army panel to review, evaluate, and provide recommendations for developing and training twenty-first century leaders. As part of the transformation process, Shinseki asked the panel to define the characteristics and skills required for the officer, noncommissioned officer, and warrant officer leaders of the transformed force. Shinseki directed the panel to check the current methods and systems for developing leaders, and explore what changes would provide the best leaders for the Army and the best Army for the nation.<sup>71</sup>

The panel results included critical recommendations about revising training system and implementing systems approach to training, integrating training and leader development model, establishing training and leader development management model, fostering lifelong learning, and creating the conceptual basis for leadership development.<sup>72</sup> It also sets a good example about how important individualized consideration, growing leaders, and mentoring was for General Shinseki.

Consequently, Shinseki demonstrated total transformational leadership throughout the entire transformation process. He demonstrated important examples for each component of transformational leadership.

### Conclusion

As one of the central figures of the U.S. Army transformation efforts initiated immediately after 9-11, General Shinseki successfully reassessed and redefined the transformation effort according to emerging problems, and put into action. He successfully established a sense of urgency and built a broad guiding coalition. He issued his transformation plan under the name of *Army Transformation Campaign Plan*, which formalized and institutionalized the transformation effort. He communicated the urgent need for transformation, his vision, and the transformation plan by all means. At the end of his tenure, he accomplished his transformation goals by establishing the Interim Force with five new Stryker brigades, modernizing the Legacy Force, and starting the conceptual studies for Objective Force. Throughout the transformation process, he successfully demonstrated emotional intelligence and transformational leadership.

After examining the emotional intelligence and transformational leadership in three different unique case studies, the research will analyze the acquired data and the

case studies within the framework of the guiding transformation process template defined in chapter 2 and transformational leadership components. The researcher's goal for chapter 4 is to determine answers for the primary and secondary research questions.

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<sup>1</sup> James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (University Press of Kansas, 1992), ix.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>3</sup> Henry William Herx, "The Political Thought of General Hans von Seeckt" (Master's thesis, Loyola University Chicago, 1964), 2-3, accessed 10 May 2016, [http://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2876&context=luc\\_theses](http://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2876&context=luc_theses).

<sup>4</sup> Corum, 26.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 27-28.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>10</sup> Williamson Murray, "Armored Warfare," in *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (London: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 37. Von Seeckt's questions that he wanted to answer by these committees were "short, concise studies on the newly-gained experiences of the war and consider the following points: a) What new situations arose in the war that had not been considered before the war? b) How effective were our pre-war views in dealing with the above situations? c) What new guidelines have been developed from the use of new weaponry in the war? d) Which new problems put forward by the war have not yet found a solution?"

<sup>11</sup> Corum, 39.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Murray, "Armored Warfare," 36.

<sup>14</sup> General of Infantry was the third-highest General officer rank in the Imperial Army, subordinate only to Colonel General and Field Marshal. It is equivalent to a three-star rank today.

- <sup>15</sup> Murray, “Armored Warfare,” 36.
- <sup>16</sup> Corum, 39.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., 37.
- <sup>18</sup> Bernard, *Transformational Leadership*, 5.
- <sup>19</sup> Corum, 39.
- <sup>20</sup> Bernard, *Transformational Leadership*, 5.
- <sup>21</sup> Corum, 37.
- <sup>22</sup> Bernard, *Transformational Leadership*, 5.
- <sup>23</sup> Williamson, “Contingency and Fragility,” 160. Seeckt’s famous order of 1 January 1921.
- <sup>24</sup> David E. Johnson, *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945* (New York: Cornell University, 1998), 4.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>27</sup> Murray, “Armored Warfare,” 23.
- <sup>28</sup> Howard Michael, “The Little Hart Memoirs,” *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* (1966): 61.
- <sup>29</sup> London Gazette, “Appointment List of the Indian Office of the British Army,” 5 October 1920, accessed 12 May 2016, <https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/32074/page/9699>.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>31</sup> London Gazette “Appointment List of the British Army,” 16 March 1922, accessed 12 May 2016, <https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/32641/supplement/2217>.
- <sup>32</sup> London Gazette “Appointment List of the British Army,” 15 June 1923, accessed 12 May 2016, <https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/32834/page/4208>.
- <sup>33</sup> London Gazette “Appointment List of the British Army,” 22 June 1928, accessed 12 May 2016, <https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/33396/supplement/4265>.

<sup>34</sup> London Gazette “Appointment List of the British Army,” 6 March 1931, accessed 12 May 2016, <https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/33696/page/1534>.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 20

<sup>36</sup> Williamson, “Armored Warfare,” 21.

<sup>37</sup> Johnson, 5.

<sup>38</sup> J. P. Harris, “The British General Staff and the Coming War, 1933-1939,” in *The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939*, ed. David French and Brian Holden Reid (Manchester: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 182.

<sup>39</sup> J. P. Harris, *Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 260.

<sup>40</sup> Quoted in Johnson, 5.

<sup>41</sup> Daniel A. Hahn, “The Process of Change: The British Armored Division; Its Development and Employment in North Africa During World War II” (Master’s thesis, Command and General Staff College, 1985), 57.

<sup>42</sup> From Montgomery-Massingberd’s unpublished Memoirs as quoted in Bond Brian, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1980)147.

<sup>43</sup> Williamson, “Armored Warfare,” 20.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Harris, “British General Staff,” 185.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Hahn, 57-58.

<sup>48</sup> Williamson, “Armored Warfare,” 20.

<sup>49</sup> Quoted in Harris, “British General Staff,” 182.

<sup>50</sup> Bernard, *Transformational Leadership*, 5.

<sup>51</sup> Hahn, 57-58.

<sup>52</sup> Bernard, *Transformational Leadership*, 5.

<sup>53</sup> Williamson, “Armored Warfare,” 29.



<sup>54</sup> John Sloan Brown, *Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the U.S. Army, 1989-2005* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History U.S. Army, 2011), 245.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 191.

<sup>56</sup> Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning, and Terry Terriff, *Transforming Military Power Since the Cold War: Britain, France, and the United States, 1991-2012* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 40-41.

<sup>57</sup> U.S. Army transformation can be listed within three continuous stages; the first stage was from the tenure of General Carl E. Vuono to the tenure of General Dennis J. Reimer, and then to General Eric Shinseki

<sup>58</sup> Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. "Eric K. Shinseki," accessed 13 May 2016, <http://www.britannica.com/biography/Eric-K-Shinseki>.

<sup>59</sup> Michael D. Formica, "Building Irreversible Momentum," in *Army Transformation: A View from the U.S Army War College*, ed. Murray Williamson (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 142.

<sup>60</sup> Donnely M. William, *Transforming an Army at War: Designing the Modular Force, 1991-2005* (Washington DC: Center of Military History Publication, 2007), 11.

<sup>61</sup> Brown, 245.

<sup>62</sup> Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff, 40-41.

<sup>63</sup> Brown, 195.

<sup>64</sup> U.S. Accounting Office *Report to Congressional Committees: Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges*. (Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office, 2001), 7-13, accessed 14 May 2016, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0296.pdf>.

<sup>65</sup> Brown, 245.

<sup>66</sup> The reason for referring them as draft is because General Shinseki argued and matured his draft vision and transformation plan with his guidance coalition.

<sup>67</sup> Brown, 195.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Bernard, *Transformational Leadership*, 5.

<sup>71</sup> Lieutenant General William M. Steele and Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Walters, "Training and Developing Army Leaders," *Military Review* 81, no. 4 (July-August 2001): 2-9.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

#### Overview

In chapter 4, the researcher will determine the answers for the primary and secondary research questions by analyzing the acquired data and three case studies. The researcher will use the guiding transformation process template defined in chapter 2 and the four components of transformational leadership as a framework.

#### Guiding Transformation Process Template

Having established a guiding transformation process template where the researcher analyzed various civilian and military change models the guiding template should increase the accuracy of the analysis of the role of emotional intelligence in the military transformation process. The research will analyze the role of emotional intelligence in each step of the guiding transformation process template.

#### Establishing Sense of Urgency

Establishing sense of urgency underlies the whole transformation process, and unless it is firmly established, accomplishment of the transformation process is unlikely.

In his book, John Kotter states, “establishing a sense of urgency is crucial to gaining needed cooperation.”<sup>1</sup> The minimum degree of commitment and cooperation, he asserts, “in an organization with 100 employees, at least two dozen must go far beyond the normal call of duty to produce a significant change. In a firm with 100,000 employees, the same might be required of 15,000 or more.”<sup>2</sup> Over 50 percent of companies fail in this first step.<sup>3</sup> Given the size of the U.S. Army in 1999, Shinseki

needed a commitment and cooperation from nearly 140,000 U.S. soldiers in order to produce a significant change.<sup>4</sup> That huge number explains why General Shinseki put such effort into creating a sense of urgency.

Another historical example that shows the importance of a sense of urgency was the German Army after the First World War. The sense of urgency was unusually high because of the level of dissatisfaction created by the Versailles Treaty. Immediately after the First World War, probably 100,000 of the entire population of the German military was committed to the German Army transformation. Douglas A. Macgregor explained, “Defeated armies often find their way into the future more easily because for them the past holds no allure. Recent victors are always hostage to their successes, revering and holding tenaciously to what they know.”<sup>5</sup>

That was exactly the case during the Interwar period for the German and British Army military transformations as explained in the case studies in chapter 3. The question remains how does a leader’s emotional intelligence influence establishing a sense of urgency, which is the most important step of the transformation process as already mentioned?

In the first case study, the German Army had been defeated so the degree of urgency was naturally high. General von Seeckt did not need to do much to create and establish a sense of urgency.

In the second case study, the preconditions for General Montgomery-Massingberd were not favorable since the British Army was the winner of the last war. Traditionally, the Royal Navy, as well as the emerging Royal Air Force, were seen as more important organization for Britain’s overall defense posture by the government, and the British

Army military culture created unfavorable conditions for a serious transformation within the Army. These unfavorable conditions for a military transformation to occur within the British Army required a sense of urgency and a transformational leader. Unfortunately, General Montgomery-Massingberd was not the leader who could establish that sense of urgency and initiate a serious transformation effort since he was not a transformational leader; however, he was emotionally intelligent.

As one of the victors of the First World War, the British Army had not established a committee until 1932 to research the lessons and new concepts of warfare that emerged from First World War.<sup>6</sup> What was worse, was altering the committee's report with significant omissions and changes to garble its findings into a more favorable and naïve judgment of the British Army's performance in the war.<sup>7</sup>

Another unfavorable precondition for Montgomery-Massingberd was the British government's ten-year rule policy that strictly limited the military budget during the entire Interwar Period. The ten-year rule policy was a British government guidance, first implemented in August 1919, which decreed that British military authorities should generate their estimates and future plans according to the "assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the ten years".<sup>8</sup> In 1928, Winston Churchill reinstated the rule.<sup>9</sup> It may be helpful to describe the impact of the ten-year rule on defense spending in numbers. After the activation of the ten-year rule, the defense spending of the British military went down from £766 million in 1919-1920 to £189 million in 1921-1922, and £102 million in 1932.<sup>10</sup> "Even more distressing for the British Army was the fact that sister services received priority for funding, personnel, equipment, and training."<sup>11</sup>

Lastly, the regimental culture within the British Army was creating another unfavorable condition for a serious transformation. Williamson Murray defines the negative effect of the regimental culture for the British Army as:

it (regimental culture) engendered a “muddy boots” approach to soldiering, one that regarded intellectual effort with contempt and retarded an understanding of operations beyond battalion level. Moreover, the British professional military education system was incapable of lifting officers’ understanding out of the concerns of regimental soldiering. Some commanders even regarded junior officers who sought positions at the staff college as deserters, disloyal to the regiment, and overly ambitious. Finally, education at Camberley (the staff college) rarely stretched student minds or encouraged them to examine the operational and tactical lessons of the last war or of technological developments.<sup>12</sup>

Montgomery-Massingberd would have needed some effective arguments to create a high sense of urgency if he wanted to initiate a transformation process because of the abovementioned restricting conditions. Montgomery-Massingberd may have used the serious urgent threat of a rapidly growing German army as one possible argument. From the beginning of his tenure, it became obvious that the German Army was seriously preparing itself for a war, and Montgomery-Massingberd was aware of that impending threat.

He may have tried to convince the public opinion, politicians, and military personnel about the urgent need of a serious military transformation by using his emotional intelligence.<sup>13</sup> Even if he could not convince public opinion and the politicians, more than likely, he could have convinced the military personnel about the urgency, and sustain and develop the transformation effort that his predecessor initiated.

In the third case study, the U.S. Army urgently needed to solve its rapid deployment problem as well as to address the emerging and growing perception that the

U.S. Air Force was capable of winning the nation's wars solely based on its advanced command control, superior and lethal precision-guided munitions and stealth capability.

General Shinseki established a high sense of urgency, and he demonstrated the emotional intelligence to do so. He explained the reasons for an urgent, redefined, and revised military transformation, after he declared his vision and transformation plan to the elite members of industry, politics, military, and many press members.

He made an impressive start and an effective example aimed at the audience's emotions to convince them of the urgent need for a serious transformation. He started by reminding them that the Army was just several weeks away from a new century and the next millennium. He continued with giving the historical example of Elihu Root, and the tremendous transformation from a border army in the nineteenth-century to a global Army in the twentieth. He linked this historic example to the Army's recent circumstances, and stated, "the Army was now between wars, but was unlikely to have much time before it was tested again."<sup>14</sup>

Another example of General Shinseki's demonstration of his emotional intelligence for establishing sense of urgency was when he sent copies of the book, *America's First Battles*, to members of the House and the Senate of the U.S. government. He was asked about the reason for sending these books during an interview in 1999. He replied:

It's a perspective of what our nation, and primarily our army, has seen over our history. And it is an army that oftentimes went into those first battles less prepared than they could have been, and certainly than they should have been. It was background as I went to testify on why transformation was important to this army at this period of time. I wanted to at least share that perspective, so that this discussion didn't start nowhere and end nowhere, but had a foundation.<sup>15</sup>

Sending copies of the book to demonstrate the urgent need for a serious transformation that contained examples of the army's unreadiness at the beginning of every major war it was involved in, was an effort to connect the past with the present aimed at convincing these senior political leaders of a need for transformational change by tapping into their emotions and sense of responsibility.

The final example was Shinseki's answer to Senator Lieberman's question during his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1999. During his testimony, Senator Lieberman asked him if he could articulate a vision similar to the German general's, who created the blitzkrieg doctrine (Lieberman implies General Von Seeckt). Shinseki answered, "I have a lot more things to worry about than the German general did . . . like Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia." By analyzing his reply, we can understand how General Shinseki effectively demonstrated emotional intelligence to establish a sense of urgency. As mentioned in the first case study, the sense of urgency for the German Army after the First World War was high. General Shinseki declared with his reply that the urgency for the U.S. Army was higher and more urgent than the German Army's. His reply directly aimed to affect the emotions of the Senate Armed Services Committee members, and shows he was aware of his own emotions and the Senate Armed Services Committee members' emotions.

Consequently, emotional intelligence is necessary and helpful in establishing a sense of urgency, however, often it is not enough. What is also required is a transformational leader. Emotional intelligence by itself is not enough for creating a sense of urgency. As in the second case study, the British Army interwar period military



transformation demonstrated the importance and criticality of having a transformational leader.

### Building a Guiding Coalition

Building a guiding coalition generates the second step of the military transformation process, which is another important step of the whole process. Building a guiding coalition has greater importance in large organizations. such as a military organization.

Kotter emphasized the importance of the guiding coalition:

[M]ajor change is so difficult to accomplish, a powerful force is required to sustain the process. No one individual, even a monarch-like CEO, is ever able to develop the right vision, communicate it to large numbers of people, eliminate all the key obstacles, generate short-term wins, lead and manage dozens of change projects, and anchor new approaches deep in the organization's culture. Weak committees are even worse. A strong guiding coalition is always needed—one with the right composition, level of trust, and shared objective. Building such a team is always an essential part of the early stages of any effort to restructure, reengineer, or retool a set of strategies.<sup>16</sup>

Emotional intelligence has an important role in building strong guiding coalitions because the transformational leader should gain strong and accurate support by convincing people about the urgent need for transformation. As Daniel Goleman states, people have two kind of minds, rational and emotional. He explains that “these two minds operate in tight harmony for the most part, intertwining their different ways of knowing to guide us through the world.”<sup>17</sup> So for a transformational leader, convincing people to provide their strong and continuous support requires gaining buy-in of both their rational and emotional minds.

In the first case study, General von Seeckt did not need to convince the people to back his guiding coalition and gain the support of their rational and emotional minds.

Von Seeckt started with analyzing the results of First World War. He established fifty-seven committees, formed of general staff officers and experts in particular areas, to examine the broad and specific questions that First World War had raised. When one considers the total number of the German Army officer corps after the First World War was 4,000, then it can easily be understood that it was a significant amount of officers, including mostly general staff officers, involved in these studies. These fifty-seven research committees functioned as the guiding coalition of General von Seeckt.

In the second case study, to be able to establish a serious transformation effort, General Montgomery-Massingberd required a big and strong guiding coalition, however as stated previously Montgomery-Massingberd was not a transformational leader, and he did not have a vision for a serious transformation until 1935.

In early 1935, he was convinced that light units, like infantry and cavalry, were inadequate to address the German threat in Europe. As a result, the British Army prepared a comprehensive proposal paper entitled, “The Future Reorganization of the British Army,” and proposed it to the Defense Requirements Committee in September 1935. The main point of this paper was to “reorganize the British Army on such a scale that will enable it to take part in a continental war.”<sup>80</sup> However, this proposal was turned down by the Cabinet, postponing a large-scale rearmament for three years.<sup>18</sup>

General Montgomery-Massingberd’s proposal was turned down because he could not create enough sense of urgency, and he was unable to convince key leaders in both the military and politics. Why was Montgomery-Massingberd unable to create enough sense of urgency and build a guiding coalition even though he possessed emotional

intelligence? The answer is, he was not a transformational leader, and he did not demonstrate transformational leadership.

In the third case study, General Shinseki started to build his guiding coalition early during his tenure as the Vice Chief of the Army Staff. He formed three teams, assessment, integration, and consulting teams to learn and assess the emotions and thoughts of a number of 350 selected general officers, members of the secretariat, Congressional representatives and staffers, academics, and pundits,” and also “groups of field-grade officers, company-grade officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, Army civilians and family members” about the Army. These teams formed a part of his guiding coalition, and helped General Shinseki to generate his vision and change plan.

John Sloan Brown, the Director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, mentions General Shinseki’s guiding coalition

Shinseki came into office with a vision and a campaign plan and allowed himself four months to mature a supportive coalition within the Army for the changes he envisioned. Senior planning groups chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff, General Jack Keane, and others worked on details, drafted implementing strategies, and reinforced a sense of urgency. Shinseki particularly briefed and garnered the support of the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>19</sup>

When General Shinseki became Chief of Staff, there was an emerging perception of public opinion that the U.S. Air Force was capable of winning the nation’s wars solely based on its advanced command control, superior and lethal precision-guided munitions, and stealth capability. This argument was dangerous to the Army, and why General Shinseki needed the support of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He succeeded in convincing them of the urgent

need of military transformation within the Army, and as previously identified his emotional intelligence greatly assisted him.

Consequently, transformational leaders like General von Seeckt and General Shinseki capitalized on their emotional intelligence when establishing their guiding coalition and throughout the transformation process. Although Montgomery-Massingberd demonstrated emotional intelligence throughout his career, but as CIGS he could not establish a sense of urgency and a guiding coalition because of his lack of transformational leadership abilities.

### Creating a Change Vision

“Vision is the picture of future that produces passion.”<sup>20</sup> Another important step in the military transformation process is creating a change vision, which is defined as the aim of transformation and the picture of future, and motivates the followers.

A vision is essential for the transformation process for three reasons. First, it creates a clear direction for change. Second, it motivates people throughout the whole transformation process. Lastly, it makes the coordination of various actions of different people faster, easier, and more efficient.<sup>21</sup>

General Shinseki mentions the importance of vision:

It’s important in any organization that if visions have any reality at all, it’s because the organization believes that the vision is right and that they share in it. Otherwise, it becomes the good idea of one person, and that even more importantly contributes to the sense that it will not survive the departure of that individual. So this is the army’s vision. And it’s my responsibility is to give it momentum, to educate and to inform, and to get a buy-in from the rank-and-file and from the very top. One of my senior generals said that every last driver and soldier in a tank turret and truck should understand it and believe that’s what needs to be done.<sup>22</sup>

Although creating a change vision is very important for the success of the transformation process, it is not easy. It needs teamwork, involvement of a guiding coalition, various meetings, brainstorming, and analytical thinking.<sup>23</sup> That is why emotional intelligence comes into play throughout the vision creation process.

In the first case study, General von Seeckt established fifty-seven committees to research the broad and specific questions the First World War raised.<sup>24</sup> These fifty-seven committees also worked as the guiding coalition for General von Seeckt, and helped the vision creation process according to the research results they reached. Throughout that process, General von Seeckt demonstrated emotional intelligence by creating an intellectual atmosphere by allowing flexibility and tolerance to debates, and allowing people to argue their comments freely.<sup>25</sup> This example demonstrates General von Seeckt was aware of his emotions, and could control them while he recognized others' emotions and managed his relationships with them.

In the second case study, General Montgomery-Massingberd did not have a vision when he assumed the position of CIGS, nor did he create a change vision after he was convinced of the seriousness of the German threat in 1935. This was due to his inability to be a transformational leader.

In the third case study, General Shinseki had a draft vision and transformation plan when he became the Chief of Staff of the Army. He developed this draft vision and transformation plan with the help of the three teams that he had established during his tenure as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. After he assumed the position as Chief of Staff of the Army, he used the first four months in office to build his guiding coalition

and develop his vision and transformation plan. Throughout the process, General Shinseki's emotional intelligence helped him to develop an effective vision.

In conclusion, creating a change vision plays an important role for the success of the transformation process, but it is not easy, takes time, and requires the establishment of an effective guiding coalition. As a result of those requirements, a leader's emotional intelligence significantly affects the success of that vision creation process.

### Communicating the Vision

As mentioned above, creating a change vision is important, but what is more important than this is to introduce it to every member of the organization. John Kotter tells the importance of communicating the change vision in his book, "the real power of a vision is unleashed only when most of those involved in an enterprise or activity have a common goal of understanding of its goals and direction."<sup>26</sup>

In significant amount of transformation efforts, the reason for the failure is under communicating the change vision.<sup>27</sup> The typical amount of communication received by a typical member of an organization in three months is 2,300,000 words or numbers. But the typical amount of communication of a change vision received by a typical member of an organization over a three-month period is just 13,400 words. In other words, the ratio of the communication of change vision versus other communications is 0.0058.<sup>28</sup> This number explains the reason why a significant amount of transformation efforts fail.

Transformational leaders should take the advantage of every chance to communicate their vision, restate their belief in the vision, and refresh the enthusiasm of the followers. They may use metaphors, analogies, and examples that would not only make the vision simpler and more understandable, but also would address their

emotions.<sup>29</sup> And that requires emotionally intelligent leaders who are aware of their emotions and be able to control them while recognizing the audience's emotions and address them.

In the first case study, General Hans von Seeckt envisioned the renewal of the German Army from the beginning, and that is why he gave significant importance to creating a new doctrine according to the results of fifty-seven committees and training leaders and the soldiers according to that new doctrine.

General von Seeckt communicated his vision and belief in the future on various occasions. As an introduction to the new doctrine, *Army Regulation 487: Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms*, von Seeckt emphasized, “this regulation takes the strength, weaponry and equipment of a modern military major power as the norm not that of the Peace Treaty’s specified German 100,000-man army.”<sup>30</sup> This was a continuous message and source of motivation for every member of the German Army who read that new doctrine. It was a continuous way of communicating his vision and belief in the future, and a good demonstration of his emotional intelligence.

Another example of General von Seeckt’s emotional intelligence was his frequent attendance at the leader training sessions and his motivational and inspirational speeches with the trainees. Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring, who served in these leader development and training sections as an instructor, expressed his feelings about General von Seeckt:

Professionally, the Berlin years were a schooling for me. What could have replaced the debates, often held in my room, in the presence of Lieutenant General von Seeckt, who knew so well how to listen and then sum up in a way that always hit the nail on the head? What a model General Staff officer and leader of men!<sup>31</sup>

In the second case study, Field Marshall Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd did not communicate his vision because he did not provide one until his third year as CIGS in 1935. After he was convinced of the urgent need for a transformation in the British Army, due to the German threat, he proposed to reorganize mobile divisions so each included a tank and mechanized cavalry brigade, and an adequate proportion of reconnaissance troops.<sup>32</sup> The British government did not accept this proposal. However, a major reason why the British Army did not transform was due to Massingberd's inabilities as a transformational leader.

In the third case study, General Shinseki is a good example for the significant role of emotional intelligence in communicating the vision at every opportunity, and its importance for the success of the transformation effort.

When General Shinseki assumed the duties of Army Chief of Staff, he had his draft vision and transformation plan when he assumed the new assignment. He used the next four months for communicating his vision and transformation plan with important key leaders to build his guiding coalition and mature his draft vision and transformation plan.<sup>33</sup>

Another example of General Shinseki's successful communication of his vision is the 1999 annual Association of United States Army convention. In that convention, General Shinseki declared his vision by giving effective historical examples by which he aimed to stimulate emotions in order to create a sense of urgency and gain support for the transformation vision and transformation plan.

Consequently, communicating the vision at every opportunity is a significant catalyzer for the success of a transformation effort. Emotional intelligence is necessary



for the effective communication of a transformation vision. In the case studies presented, two of the leaders benefitted from their emotional intelligence, this allowed them to communicate their intent and the change vision more clearly.

### Empowering Action and Dealing with Resistance

Transformation efforts generally take time. During the change process, it is common to face resistance since people naturally do not like change. Instead, they prefer routines because change involves risk, work, and possibly loss of power or even their position.

Transformational leaders must find solutions to manage and overcome resistance to change to accomplish the transformational goal. Emotional intelligence is an important requirement and enabler to overcome the resistance to change. Managing resistance to change is mainly about motivating and convincing people of the necessity of change. A leader's emotional intelligence assists in the removal of those barriers and resistance.

In the first case, study General von Seeckt experienced opposing thoughts and resistance to change, but he was successfully able to manage them by demonstrating his emotional intelligence.

The most significant opposing opinions were held by “the defensive school” of thought. The most staunch supporter of this school was General of Infantry Walther Reinhardt. He believed and argued that defense had the military advantage. He also believed and supported giving the key leadership positions to front line officers in the new Army. Until his death in 1930 he opposed the strategy and tactics of General von Seeckt.<sup>34</sup> Apart from “defensive school” of thought, the other opposing views were held by traditionalists, the People's War, and the Psychological School of Thoughts.<sup>35</sup>

General Shinseki was always open to others thoughts and ideas, even opposing ones. He was a good listener and a persuasive leader that demonstrates his emotional intelligence, including all four domains of Goleman's emotional intelligence model. As previously mentioned, Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring's comments about General von Seeckt's leadership style present a good example of emotional intelligence.

In the second case study, there was resistance to change within the British Army, due primarily to the traditional regimental culture. Field Marshal, Sir Montgomery-Massingberd should have dealt with that resistance to accomplish a transformation within the British Army. However, he could not overcome the resistance to change in spite of his emotional intelligence. His inability to overcome the resistance to change was due to his lack of transformational leadership abilities.

In the third case study, General Shinseki demonstrated a good example of dealing with resistance, and utilizing the role of emotional intelligence in that process. Conditions were unfavorable for the Army because of the growing perception in the public opinion that only the Air Force was capable of winning the nation's wars, based on its advanced command control, superior, and lethal precision-guided munitions, and stealth capability. That dangerous perception could have hampered sufficient funding for the Army transformation.

To remove that perception barrier, General Shinseki sent copies of the book, *America's First Battles*, to the House and the Senate before his testimony in 1999. By doing so, he aimed to clearly demonstrate how the Army often went into those first battles less prepared than it could have been, and certainly less than it should have been.

During an interview, he explained the reason behind sending the book to the House and the Senate.

The first battles of all of the wars we have fought have seen tremendous price and human loss because of our lack of preparedness for that war. This is the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War and we are about to celebrate events like Task Force Smith--valorous fighting by great young Americans. Unfortunately, they were not as prepared as we should have been for that conflict. And it's about not repeating the Task Force Smith experience. We're better than that, and that's a matter of being able to generate the support that we need for this transformation.<sup>36</sup>

During his tenure, General Shinseki was completely aware how the danger of resistance to change could inhibit a transformation effort. He placed a great emphasis on "building irreversible momentum" for the success of the Transformation Campaign Plan.<sup>37</sup> He communicated to increase commitment and support, which was a demonstration of his emotional intelligence.

Another example of General Eric Shinseki's demonstration of emotional intelligence dealing with resistance is a quote by him in 2001: "If you dislike change, you are going to like irrelevance even less."<sup>38</sup>

Consequently, empowering action and dealing with resistance forms an important part of the transformation process, and is critical for the success of the transformation effort. Transformational leaders should find solutions for dealing with resistance and removing barriers. Emotional intelligence is one of the most critical means for transformational leaders, which presents great opportunities to deal with resistance, and increase commitment to the transformation effort. The three case studies provide good examples about the critical role of emotional intelligence in dealing with resistance.

## Implementing Change in the Organization Culture

The last step, of the Guiding Transformation Process Template, forms the most important stage of the transformation effort. Heraclitus expressed the continuity of change in fifth-century BC as “the only thing that is constant is change.”<sup>39</sup> To keep the organization up to date, transformational leaders must embed the change in the organizational culture; in other words, they must institutionalize the change.

Having already identified that *organizational culture* is “the shared beliefs of a group, used to solve problems and manage internal anxiety.”<sup>40</sup> The two pillars of the organizational culture are *norms of behavior* and *shared values*. John Kotter defines norms of behavior as:

Common or pervasive ways of acting that are found in a group and that persist because group members tend to behave in ways that teach these practices to new members, rewarding those who fit in and sanctioning those who do not.<sup>41</sup>

Norms of behavior are what organizations do.<sup>42</sup> Shared values are “important concerns and goals shared by most of the members in a group that tend to shape group behavior and that often persist over time even when group members change.”<sup>43</sup> Shared values are why organizations do certain things. Norms of behavior and values together forms the shared beliefs.<sup>44</sup>

The basic tool that transformational leaders can use to sustain, strengthen, and/or modify shared beliefs that form organizational culture is *organizational climate*.<sup>45</sup> Organizational climate is the mutual insights of members of an organization. In other words, organizational climate can be defined as how members feel within the organization. As a result, transformational leaders should create a supportive command

climate that fosters mutual trust and psychological safety to implement change in the organizational culture.<sup>46</sup>

Figure 11 depicts the process and components of changing the organizational culture.




Figure 11. Changing Organizational Culture

*Source:* Carey W. Walker and Matthew J. Bonnot, "Myth Busting: Coming to Grips with Organizational Culture and Climate" (US Army Combined Arms Center, 2015), accessed 26 April 2016, [http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/DCL/Myth\\_Busting\\_Coming\\_to\\_Grips\\_with\\_Organizational\\_Culture\\_and\\_Climate.pdf](http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/DCL/Myth_Busting_Coming_to_Grips_with_Organizational_Culture_and_Climate.pdf).

If changing the organizational culture is about changing the shared beliefs within the organization, and establishing a supportive climate is a tool for changing shared beliefs, emotional intelligence is an important tool that transformational leaders need and should use. Creating a supportive organizational climate to change shared beliefs of an organization is mainly about communication and influencing.

Emotional intelligence has an important role in communication and influence. To establish effective communication and ability to influence people, transformational leaders should be aware of their emotions, and be able to control them. Also transformational leaders should be able to realize the emotions of the people that they want to communicate and influence, and be able to handle relationships with those people by recognizing their emotions.<sup>47</sup>

In the first case study, General von Seeckt demonstrated an example of implementing the change in the organizational culture. The culture of the German Army, which was principally formed during the Moltke's tenure, fostered critical thinking, sharing and arguing the ideas without fear. German Army culture historically provided for everyone to have a voice in the organization.

After the First World War, the German Army was devastated, and General von Seeckt found himself in a position to restore it. He pursued the traditional German Army culture about freedom of thought to argue ideas and engage in critical thinking. Corum expressed the intellectual atmosphere that General von Seeckt engendered:

While insisting that the army adopt a common operational and tactical doctrine, the *Reichswehr* avoided intellectual stagnation—one of the great enemies of any army—by allowing flexibility and tolerating debate on military matters. Officers who dissented from the new operational concepts, such as Kurt Hesse, were allowed to argue openly for radical alternatives without penalty. As a result of the high command's attitude, the mobile-war doctrines of the 1920s were gradually transformed into the *blitzkrieg* concepts of the 1930s.<sup>48</sup>

General von Seeckt demonstrated his emotional intelligence by implementing change in the organizational culture. One must be aware of his or her own emotions and be able to control them to create that kind of intellectual atmosphere, as well as one must recognize another's emotions and be able to handle relationships.<sup>49</sup> Field Marshal

Albrecht Kesselring's memories set a perfect example as proof of General von Seeckt's use of emotional intelligence to implement change in the culture.<sup>50</sup>

The second case study presents another example of how the lack of success in implementing change in the organizational culture affects the success of a transformation effort. The British Army's regimental culture stood as a barrier against any transformation effort.<sup>51</sup>

As a result of that regimental culture, Field Marshal Montgomery-Massingberd needed to change the organizational culture to be able to initiate a transformation effort; but he was unable to create any change within the existing organizational culture. The main reason for his failure was the lack of his transformational leadership abilities; however, he was an emotionally intelligent leader.

The third case study presents another example of the critical capability of organizational culture in the continuous perpetuation of transformation efforts. The military transformation effort to reorganize the U.S. Army started immediately after the end of the Cold War, during the tenure of General Carl E. Vuono, and has continued, with modifications by each Army Chief of Staff.

The continuation of transformation is often formed in national and organizational culture. The American people are generally open to change due to its culture. As a subculture of that national culture, the Army's culture accepts the inevitability of change.

The Army took advantage of this characteristic by integrating military transformation into the education system. All of the Army's educational institutional curriculums teach or support the idea that change is continuous, and the Army continuously needs transformation to maintain its ability to win the nation's wars.

The Command and General Staff College, the Army's field grade officer education institution, is an example. Its curriculum is military transformation-centric. The Army's future leaders, who will lead and transform the Army, are taught military history transformations; what leadership abilities are required to lead a transformation effort; and how to execute that transformation in force management classes. The expected role of the transformational leader is to create a positive organizational climate that will support and sustain that advantageous Army culture and the transformation effort.

General Shinseki believed the key factor to implementing the change he envisioned in the organizational culture, was developing and training leaders.<sup>52</sup> In 2001, he employed the Army Training and Leader Development Panel to study and identify the characteristics and skills required for leaders of the transforming force, and what changes were the most important part of the transformation effort.

The primary findings of that panel was the need to develop self-aware, critical, and creative thinkers, and adaptable leaders, which were implemented in the Army's leadership development programs. It still forms the basic focus of the Army's leadership development strategy. This is another example change is implemented in the organizational culture. General Shinseki primarily created a supportive, positive, organizational climate to modify the norms and the values of the Army's organizational culture for institutionalizing the transformation effort, he used his emotional intelligence to create a positive command climate.

In conclusion, transformational leaders should create a supportive command climate that fosters mutual trust and psychological safety to implement change in the organizational culture. To create a supportive command climate, they primarily use



communication and influence, which requires emotional intelligence. The aforementioned case studies demonstrate both successful and unsuccessful examples.

After analyzing the role of emotional intelligence throughout the transformation process, step by step, the research will analyze transformational leadership and its four components to define the relationship between emotional intelligence and transformational leadership, and the role of transformational leadership in the transformation process.

### The Components of Transformational Leadership

Transformational leadership first appeared in the literature from 1970s, and has been growing in use since then. It is primarily used for expanding transactional leadership by “motivating followers to do more than they originally intended and often even more than they thought possible.”<sup>53</sup> Transformational leaders “set more challenging expectations and typically achieve higher performances.”<sup>54</sup> The components of transformational leadership are idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration.

### Idealized Influence and Inspirational Motivation

The first two components of transformational leadership are idealized influence and inspirational motivation, which emphasize the importance of being an inspiring role model for followers, and motivates them about the urgent need for the transformation, and the importance of their role in the success of the transformation effort.<sup>55</sup>

These two components of the transformational leadership, idealized influence, and inspirational motivation, form two important aspects required of a successful military

transformation process. Because these two components play an important role in establishing a sense of urgency, building a guiding coalition, creating a change vision, communicating the vision, empowering action and dealing with resistance, and implementing change in the organizational culture. In other words, these two components have a critical role in the entire transformation process.

Being an inspiring role model and motivating the followers has a strong link with emotional intelligence abilities. Transformational leaders should be aware of their emotions, and be able to control them to be an inspiring role model. Moreover, being an inspirational role model requires the ability to recognize followers' emotions as well and how handle the relationship with the followers.

Inspirational motivation and motivating followers also requires emotional intelligence. The two primary tools of motivation are communication and influence, which requires the demonstration of the four components of emotional intelligence: self-awareness of emotions, control one's own emotions, recognition of the others' emotions, and ability to handle relationships.<sup>56</sup>

In the first case study, General von Seeckt's demonstration as an influencing role model and motivational leader, forms good examples of the important role of the first two components of transformational leadership, idealized influence and inspirational motivation, in the success of the transformation process. His statement in the introduction of the new German Army's doctrine, *Army Regulation 487: Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms*, said, "this regulation takes the strength, weaponry and equipment of a modern military major power as the norm not that of the Peace Treaty's specified

German 100.000-man army.”<sup>57</sup> It sets a significant example about his idealized influence and inspirational motivation.

The second case study presents a unique example about the importance of the presence of a transformational leader over the success of a transformation process. Field Marshal Montgomery-Massingberd demonstrated his emotional intelligence in various examples but he could not initiate a transformation effort during his tenure. The primary reason for that was his lack of transformational leadership abilities.

When Montgomery-Massingberd assumed the role of CIGS, he did not sustain the transformation effort that had been initiated in the tenure of his predecessor, Lord Milne. The reasons were, first, Montgomery-Massingberd did not see an urgent need for a transformation; and second, he did not believe in the already initiated transformation effort, developing armored warfare, in his predecessor’s tenure. Instead, he thought the modernization of the traditional organization was more appropriate.<sup>58</sup> After he was convinced in the growing German threat and an urgent need for a transformation within the British Army to counter that threat in 1935, he couldn’t establish a sense of urgency, build a guiding coalition, break the effects of regimental culture against change, demonstrate an influencing role model, motivate people, and consequently he could not initiate a transformation effort.

The extreme circumstances of the Great Britain and the British Army, lack of political support, public opinion against war, the politicians’ priority of Navy and Air Force versus Army, and the regimental culture required a leader equipped with extreme transformational leadership abilities. But, unfortunately, Montgomery-Massingberd was too far removed from these features.

The third case study also presents an example for the role of idealized influence and inspirational motivation. General Shinseki started to prepare for a transformation effort before he became the Chief of the Army Staff. He established committees “to gather information and facilitate support for his programs downstream,” including the Army’s key leaders, officers, NCOs, and soldiers.<sup>59</sup> This was a perfect example of his idealized influence about the need for an urgent transformation. After he assumed the Chief of the Army Staff he continuously communicated the urgent need for a transformation, his vision, the Transformation Campaign Plan and motivated the people inside and outside the Army. This was also a perfect example of his idealized influence and inspirational motivation.

In conclusion, the first two components of the transformational leadership, idealized influence, and inspirational motivation have a great impact on the success of the transformation process. It can be said that their existence is mandatory for the success of the transformation process. The three case studies present examples of that fact. Another important conclusion is the relationship between emotional intelligence and these two components of transformational leadership. The demonstration of these two components of transformational leadership requires the existence of the four domains of the emotional intelligence, self-awareness of emotions, control one’s own emotions, recognition of the others’ emotions, and ability to handle relationships.<sup>60</sup>

### Intellectual Stimulation

The third component of transformational leadership is intellectual stimulation, which motivates the followers to be innovative and creative by questioning assumptions, reframing problems, and approaching old situations in new ways.<sup>61</sup> Similar to the first

two components of transformational leadership, idealized influence and inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation also requires the existence of the four domains of emotional intelligence in the leader. Motivating followers to be innovative and creative is primarily related with communication and influence, both of which requires self-awareness of one's own emotions, the control of one's own emotions, recognition of the others' emotions, and the ability to handle relationships.<sup>62</sup>

Intellectual stimulation is also important for the success of the transformation process in three ways: first, it triggers to find creative ways for the success of the transformation effort; second, it increases the followers' support for the transformation; and third, it supports the implementation of change in the organizational culture.

Transformational leaders stimulate the followers' critical and creative thinking abilities to find creative solutions for the success of the transformation effort. For example, in the first case study, General von Seeckt established fifty-seven committees to find answers for the questions that the First World War had raised. The members of these committees totaled four hundred generals and general staff officers who were 10 percent of the total officer number of the German Army. He stimulated their critical and creative thinking abilities by asking critical and engrossing questions.<sup>63</sup> The committee's results provided for the creation of the new German Army doctrine that formed the basis of the German Army's Second World War doctrine.

Another example is the U.S. Army transformation under the command of General Shinseki was expressed in the third case study. General Shinseki asked the U.S. Army War College to conduct Army Transformation war games. In response, Vigilant Warrior Series, Army Transformation war games were conducted. The various probable scenarios

in those war game series were applied to the Army's Objective Force building effort in order to assess, shape and revise it.<sup>64</sup>

Second, intellectual stimulation can be used as a tool by transformational leaders to increase followers' support to the transformation effort. For example, in the first case study, the establishment of fifty-seven committees to research the First World War also provided the direct involvement and support of 400 generals and general staff officers.

Third, intellectual stimulation can be used as a supportive tool by transformational leaders to implement change in the organizational culture. In the third case study, General Shinseki employed the Army Training and Leader Development Panel in 2001 to identify the characteristics and skills required for leaders of the transforming force, and what changes were required as the most important part of the transformation effort.

The primary result of that panel was the need to develop self-aware, critical, and creative thinkers, and adaptive leaders, which was implemented in the Army's leadership development programs. It still forms the basic focus of the Army's leadership development strategy.

In conclusion, the third component of the transformational leadership, intellectual stimulation, affects the success of the transformation process by finding creative means for the success of the transformation effort, increasing the followers' support for the transformation, and supporting the implementation of change in the organizational culture. Another important conclusion is, to be able to demonstrate intellectual stimulation needed, transformational leaders should be talented in all four domains of the emotional intelligence.

## Individualized Consideration

The last component of the transformational leadership is individualized consideration, which places special effort on followers' needs for achievement and growth by acting as a coach or mentor. Individualized consideration is facilitated by creating a supportive, organizational climate, and by enabling new learning opportunities for followers.<sup>65</sup> It may also be defined as creating learning organizations.

Demonstration of individualized consideration requires the presence of the four domains of emotional intelligence. Individualized consideration, namely recognizing and identifying followers' needs and mentoring, is primarily about communication and influence, both of which requires the presence of the four domains of the emotional intelligence.

Individualized consideration is also important for the success of the transformation process, especially for empowering action and dealing with resistance since resistance to change is primarily about individuals' mindset. To counter resistance and change individuals' mindset, it is necessary to identify their needs, create learning opportunities, and communicating and influencing them by mentoring.

In the first case study, General von Seeckt defined the leader development and training as the center of gravity for the success of the transformation effort. He actively participated in daily training sessions. Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring served in these leader development and training sessions as an instructor, and his comments about General von Seeckt provides a good example for the individualized consideration of General von Seeckt.<sup>66</sup>

## Conclusion

In chapter 4, the research analyzed; the role of emotional intelligence in the six step Guiding Transformation Process Template; the relation between emotional intelligence and the four components of transformational leadership; and the role of the four components of transformational leadership in the transformation process.

First, the researcher realized all four domains of emotional intelligence have a great importance and effect over every stage of the transformation process. Second, the researcher found that all four domains of emotional intelligence are required for the demonstration of the four components of the transformational leadership. Lastly, the researcher comprehended that the four components of the transformational leadership have a great importance in the transformation process, and the lack of transformational leadership abilities makes the success or even the initiation of the transformation effort impossible. The second case study, the interwar period British Army, presents an example for that.

Now the researcher will explain the results of the research and the conclusions in chapter 5. The researcher will also provide recommendations and suggestions for further research.

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<sup>1</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 36.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>3</sup> Kotter, "Leading Change; Why Transformation Efforts Fail," 3.

<sup>4</sup> Required enlisting the total strength of the U.S. Army.

<sup>5</sup> Michael Evans, *Changing the Army: The Roles of Doctrine, Development and Training* (Duntroon, Australia: The Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000), 2.



- <sup>6</sup> Williamson, “Armored Warfare,” 25.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid., 20.
- <sup>8</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 2004), 273.
- <sup>9</sup> The National Archives, “The Ten-Year Rule and Disarmament,” accessed 14 May 2016, <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/10-year-rule-disarmament.htm>.
- <sup>10</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy, Background Influences On British External Policy, 1865-1980*, 2nd ed. (Waukegan, IL: Fontana Press, 1981), 231.
- <sup>11</sup> Murray, “Armored Warfare,” 10.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., 23-24.
- <sup>13</sup> Montgomery-Massingberd was emotionally intelligent and demonstrated his emotional intelligence several times. An example was the 1928 tank experiment. Montgomery Messingberd believed that the modernization and motorization of the infantry and cavalry was more important than creating independent tank units. In the 1928 tank experiments, he affected the result of the exercises, and convinced the CIGS to abolish the Armored Force and the mechanization of the cavalry and infantry divisions after discussion, which demonstrated Montgomery-Massingberd’s emotional intelligence because the CIGS Lord Milne was a great supporter of armored warfare and establishment of the Armored Force. To convince him, required the use of emotional intelligence.
- <sup>14</sup> Brown, 195.
- <sup>15</sup> Eric K. Shinseki, interview, Frontline, accessed 13 April 2016, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/future/interviews/shinseki.html>
- <sup>16</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 52.
- <sup>17</sup> Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More than IQ* (New York, Bantam Books, 1995), 9.
- <sup>18</sup> Harris, “British General Staff,” 185.
- <sup>19</sup> Brown, 194.
- <sup>20</sup> Bill Hybels, *Courageous Leadership* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2002), quoted in Graham Chastney, “Vision Is a Picture of the Future That Produces...,” Graham Chastney, accessed 17 April 2016, <http://grahamchastney.com/2012/02/vision-is-a-picture-of-the-future-that-produces-passion-bill-hybels/>.

- <sup>21</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 68-69.
- <sup>22</sup> Shinseki, interview, Frontline.
- <sup>23</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 81.
- <sup>24</sup> Williamson, "Armored Warfare, 36.
- <sup>25</sup> Corum, xvi.
- <sup>26</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 85.
- <sup>27</sup> John Kotter, "Leading Change; Why Transformation Efforts Fail," 6.
- <sup>28</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 89.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 91.
- <sup>30</sup> Quoted by Corum, S. James, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg* (Kansas U.S, 1992), 39.
- <sup>31</sup> Corum, 50.
- <sup>32</sup> Harris, *Men, Ideas, and Tanks*, 260.
- <sup>33</sup> Brown, 195.
- <sup>34</sup> Williamson, "Armored Warfare, 36.
- <sup>35</sup> Corum, 51-67.
- <sup>36</sup> Shinseki, interview, Frontline.
- <sup>37</sup> Jason Sherman, "Momentum, Mo' Money," *Armed Forces Journal International* (October 2000): 46.
- <sup>38</sup> Quoted in Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Marines Turned Soldiers," *National Review Online*, December 10, 2001.
- <sup>39</sup> Heraclitus, "Quotes," Goodreads, 2016, accessed 26 April 2016, <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/336994-the-only-thing-that-is-constant-is-change-->.
- <sup>40</sup> Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4th ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2010), 18.
- <sup>41</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 148.
- <sup>42</sup> Walker and Bonnot.

- <sup>43</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 148.
- <sup>44</sup> Walker and Bonnot.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., 3-4.
- <sup>47</sup> Goleman, 43.
- <sup>48</sup> Corum, xvi.
- <sup>49</sup> Goleman, 43.
- <sup>50</sup> Corum, 50.
- <sup>51</sup> Williamson, "Armored Warfare, 22-24.
- <sup>52</sup> Shinseki, interview, Frontline.
- <sup>53</sup> Bernard M. Bass, *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 4, 6. Bernard M. Bass defines the transactional leadership as; transactional leadership occurs when the leader rewards or disciplines the follower depending on the adequacy of the follower's performance.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>55</sup> Bernard, *Transformational Leadership*, 5.
- <sup>56</sup> Goleman, 43.
- <sup>57</sup> Corum, 39.
- <sup>58</sup> The conservative thought and his belief in the regimental culture played primary role in Montgomery-Massingberd's opinion about modernizing the traditional army instead of developing armored warfare doctrine.
- <sup>59</sup> Brown, 245.
- <sup>60</sup> Goleman, 43.
- <sup>61</sup> Bernard, *Transformational Leadership*, 5.
- <sup>62</sup> Goleman, 43.

<sup>63</sup> General von Seeckt asked these committees to write “short, concise studies on the newly-gained experiences of the war and consider the following points: a) What new situations arose in the war that had not been considered before the war? b) How effective were our pre-war views in dealing with the above situations? c) What new guidelines have been developed from the use of new weaponry in the war? d) Which new problems put forward by the war have not yet found a solution?” Corum, 37.

<sup>64</sup> Brown, 200.

<sup>65</sup> Bernard, *Transformational Leadership*, 5.

<sup>66</sup> “Professionally, the Berlin years were a schooling for me. What could have replaced the debates, often held in my room, in the presence of Lieutenant General von Seeckt, who knew so well how to listen and then sum up in a way that always hit the nail on the head? What a model General Staff officer and leader of men!” Corum, 50.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

This research was inspired by the absence of studies done about the role of emotional intelligence in the military transformation process. The researcher first will explain the general results. Second, the researcher will answer the primary research question and secondary research questions that motivated the author to research the topic. Finally, the researcher will present the recommendations.

The goal of this research was to identify the role of emotional intelligence in the military transformation process. After conducting research and analyzing the data, the researcher realized that each of the four domains of emotional intelligence defined by Goleman—self-awareness, controlling one’s own emotions, social awareness, and handling relationships—are required in the entire transformation process. The details of the conclusion will be included in the answer of the primary research question.

The demonstration of the four components of the transformational leadership requires the existence of all four domains of emotional intelligence, which will be conveyed in the related secondary question.

The researcher’s third conclusion is that the four components of transformational leadership have important effects on the transformation process, and are required for the success. The lack of the leader’s transformational leadership abilities makes the success of the transformation process impossible. The research of the interwar period of the British Army for the second case study is an example of this assertion.

Finally, existence of a transformational leader is mandatory for the success of the transformation process, but it does not guarantee success, because many factors affect the success of the transformation process, such as political support, public opinion, economic reasons, international political, and strategical environment, etc.

After presenting the general conclusions now the researcher will express the achieved results about the primary research question.

Primary Research Question: How does Emotional Intelligence  
Affect the Military Transformation Process?

As said, the researcher recognized all of the four domains of emotional intelligence were defined by Goleman—self-awareness, controlling one’s own emotions, social awareness, and handling relationships—are required and have important effects in the entire transformation process. Because, as change is primarily about changing the followers’ behavior, role modeling, inspiration, communication, influencing, and motivation, naturally become important tools to change the behavior. That makes emotional intelligence one of the most important factors of the transformation process. The researcher will explain the effects of emotional intelligence in each phase of the six step guiding transformation process template.

The first step of the guiding transformation process is establishing a sense urgency, which is primarily about influencing people inside and outside the organization, about an urgent need for a military transformation through communication. Naturally, all four domains of the emotional intelligence become an important tool, if the objective is to influence by communication. Former military transformation efforts verify the importance of emotional intelligence in establishing a sense of urgency.

The second step of the guiding transformation process is building a guiding coalition, which is mainly about communication and influencing. That is why, similar to the first step, all of the four domains of emotional intelligence are required and effective. The first and third case studies provide examples of that assertion.

The third step of the guiding transformation process is creating a change vision. The creation of the change vision is the cooperation of the transformational leader and the guiding coalition. Transformational leaders should get the support and confirmation of every member of the guiding coalition about the change vision to include the guiding coalition to the transformation effort. Emotional intelligence takes place in the third step during the discussion of the change vision with the guiding coalition; and all of the four domains of the emotional intelligence are required. The first and third case studies provide examples for that assertion.

The fourth step of the guiding transformation process is communicating the change vision, and all of the four domains of the emotional intelligence are required, and affect the success. The first and third case studies provide examples for that assertion.

The fifth step of the guiding transformation process is empowering action and dealing with resistance. The primary aim of that step is convincing people of the need for the transformation, change vision, and the transformation plan. The main tools that transformational leaders use in that step are communication and influencing, which are directly linked with the four domains of the emotional intelligence. The first and third case studies provide examples for that assertion.

The last step of the guiding transformation process is implementing change in the organizational culture. The primary aim of that step is to define necessary arrangements

in the organizational culture, and then create a supportive organizational climate that fosters mutual trust and psychological safety to implement change in the organizational culture.<sup>1</sup> All of the four domains of emotional intelligence are essential and useful in creating a supportive organizational climate as this is a primary means to affect how members and leaders feel within the organizational atmosphere, and has a direct link with emotions. The first and the third case studies present examples for that assertion.

In conclusion, all of the four domains of the emotional intelligence defined by Goleman are essential in the entire transformation process, and provides opportunities for a successful transformation process.

The researcher will deliver the achieved results about the secondary questions.

#### Secondary Research Questions

At the beginning of the research process, the researcher defined five secondary research questions that are essential to determine the answer for the primary research question.

What is emotional intelligence and what is the relationship between emotional intelligence and transformational leadership?

Emotional intelligence can be defined as “the ability to perceive emotion, integrate emotion to facilitate thought, understand emotions, and to regulate emotions to promote personal growth,” and is also used to manage relationships. Emotional intelligence has four domains: self-awareness, control of one’s own emotions, social awareness, and handle relationships.<sup>2</sup>

There is a direct link between emotional intelligence and transformational leadership. Transformational leadership has four components: idealized influence,



inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. All of the four domains of the emotional intelligence are essential for the demonstration of each component of the transformational leadership.

In conclusion, it can be asserted that if one has transformational leadership abilities, he or she also has emotional intelligence abilities.

#### What is Military Transformation Process: What Are Phases of That Process?

The military transformation process, which is a change process that goes through a series of phases in order to transform militaries, usually requires a considerable length of time. The previous examples of military transformation efforts verify the truth of that fact. The phases of the military transformation process change according to different models. The researcher analyzed a total of six change models, consisting of four civilian and two military, recognizing all of six change models include similar phases. This realization inspired the researcher to create a guiding template for the military transformation process.

#### What Can Be Used as a Guiding Template for Military Transformation Process?

As mentioned, the analysis of the six different change models inspired the researcher to create a guiding transformation process template that consists of six steps. The six steps of the guiding transformation process template are: establish sense of urgency, building a guiding coalition, creating a change vision, communicating the vision, empowering action and dealing with resistance, and implementing change in the organizational culture.

The primary reason for creating a guiding template is to increase the accuracy of the study. It will eliminate the deficiencies and errors of each change model using consistent steps to research the role of emotional intelligence in a universal transformational model.

What is the role of emotional intelligence in the previous successful and unsuccessful military transformation efforts?

The researcher analyzed three case studies: the interwar period German Army under the command of General Hans von Seeckt, the interwar period British Army under the command of Field Marshal Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, and the post-Cold War, U.S. Army transformation under the command of General Shinseki. The researcher analyzed the German Army and the U.S. Army military transformations as successful examples, and the British Army military transformation as an unsuccessful military transformation.

The first and third case studies proved the necessity for all four domains of emotional intelligence throughout the entire transformation process. The second case study presented a unique result for the researcher. In the second case study, the researcher found the examples for the demonstration of all of the four domains of the emotional intelligence in the leader, Field Marshal Montgomery-Massingberd, but he was unable to initiate a transformation effort in his tenure. The researcher concluded that, although Montgomery-Massingberd was emotionally intelligent, his lack of transformational leadership abilities caused his unsuccessfulness in initiating a transformation effort.

This was not the case for the first and the third case studies because both leaders, General Hans von Seeckt and General Shinseki, had all four components of the transformational leadership.

What is the role of leaders in the previous successful and unsuccessful military transformation efforts?

Kotter states the importance of the leaders in the transformation process as “the key to creating and sustaining the kind of successful twenty-first century organization is the leaders.”<sup>3</sup> The author focused on leaders when analyzing and evaluating the three case studies because of their tremendous role and importance in the success of the transformation process.

In this context, the author researched three case studies, focusing on the leader in each case study. When the results are evaluated, the researcher realized that leaders are the center of gravity of the transformation process, and they are the primary reason for its success or the failure. Another important conclusion about leaders is that their transformational leadership and emotional intelligence abilities are the core importance and affect the overall success of the transformation process.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of this thesis, the researcher presents following three recommendations for the military education and training institutes: (1) adapting transformational leadership development programs in the curriculum; (2) incorporating emotional intelligence development programs in the curriculum; and (3) incorporating detailed analysis studies of past military transformation efforts in the curriculum as case studies.

## Future Research

Future research should focus on the analysis of the topic with different methodologies, using, for example, interviews or surveys. Interviews should focus on the former U.S. Army Chief of Staffs, starting with General Vuono and continuing with General Sullivan, General Reimer, General Shinseki, and General Schoomaker, and so on. Because as one of the first military organizations that successfully institutionalizes military transformation and implements it in the organizational culture, the U.S. Army presents a perfect example for the future researches about the topic.

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<sup>1</sup> Walker and Bonnot.

<sup>2</sup> Mayer and Salovey, "Emotional Intelligence," 3-31.

<sup>3</sup> Kotter, *Leading Change*, 175.

## GLOSSARY

Change Vision. A concise statement of where a group or organization and its people are headed.<sup>1</sup>

Emotional Intelligence. The ability to perceive emotion, integrate emotion to facilitate thought, understand emotions, and to regulate emotions to promote personal growth.<sup>2</sup>

Military Transformation. A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit nation's advantages and protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain country's strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.<sup>3</sup>

Military Transformation Process. Military transformation process is the change process that goes through a series of phases in order to transform militaries. It usually requires a considerable length of time.

Organizational Climate. The mutual insights of the members of the organization.<sup>4</sup>

Organizational Culture. The shared beliefs of a group used to solve problems and manage internal anxiety.<sup>5</sup>

Resistance to Change. The unwillingness and lack of commitment to change effort due to the changes to routines, low trust, lack of competence, and poor communication.

Transformational Leadership. The process whereby a person engages with others and creates a connection that raises the level of motivation and morality in both the leader and the follower.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Kotter, John P. as cited in Pamela S. Shockley-Zalabek, Sherwyn Morreale, and Michael Hackman, *Building High Trust Organization: Strategies for Supporting Five Key Dimensions of Trust* (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 2010), 48-51.

<sup>2</sup> Mayer and Salovey, "Emotional Intelligence," 3-31.

<sup>3</sup> Office of Force Transformation.

<sup>4</sup> Walker and Bonnot.

<sup>5</sup> Schein, 18.

<sup>6</sup> Northouse, 172.

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